Converged Prices Without Communication: Evidence Limits of Public Collusion Screens in LLM Auctions
Niranjan Baddam, Mutalib Begmuratov, Ahmed Tariq, Krishan Kumar Verma, Dora Zelenyanszki · Team Beyond Price Signals
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can public price statistics distinguish an explicit agreement among language-model pricing agents from ordinary market convergence? In a double-auction simulator with four GPT-4.1 sellers and four adaptive buyers, we compare two 30-round sessions: one with seller communication disabled and one with an experimenter-authored agreement to keep asks at or above 90. Seller cost was 80 and buyer value 100. The exchange and adherence rule were fixed before generation; prices were not scripted. Without communication, asks became stable and closely aligned; a separate Gemini session showed the same pattern. In both communication-off cases, late-window mean asks lay above cost but below reference 90, illustrating benchmark dependence of raw markup. In the constructed session, every quote met the floor through round 16; afterwards, most were one or two cents below it. During rounds 16–30, the constructed session had greater temporal and cross-seller dispersion than the baseline, although absolute dispersion was low in both. These are exploratory observations from one session per condition, not estimates of causal effects or calibrated detector performance. They support assessing public price patterns alongside communication evidence when evaluating claims of explicit agreement.
Reviews
Testing whether public collusion screens wrongly flag LLM agents that converge without talking is a relevant question. The best result is Table 3, where the injected-agreement session was more dispersed than the no-communication baseline, so a dispersion screen would have flagged the innocent market. However, the planned design was not carried out, and every comparison rests on one session per condition. The price floor of 90 also sits where the baseline settled anyway, which limits what the floor conditions show
Cite this project
@misc{baddam2026converged,
title = {{Converged Prices Without Communication: Evidence Limits of Public Collusion Screens in LLM Auctions}},
author = {Niranjan Baddam and Mutalib Begmuratov and Ahmed Tariq and Krishan Kumar Verma and Dora Zelenyanszki},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/converged-prices-without-communication-evidence-limits-of-public-collusion-screens-in-llm-auctions-8qyd}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/converged-prices-without-communication-evidence-limits-of-public-collusion-screens-in-llm-auctions-8qyd}
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