Covert Signalling Under Observation
Sagnik Chatterjee · Team Aurora
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Two AI agents that share a chat channel can agree on a code and pass a secret inside a message that reads like an ordinary work update. The usual defence is to watch the channel. This project tests, with small open models, how well such a code works and whether either of two cheap defences stops it: - a monitor: an LLM reads every message and flags anything that looks coded; - a paraphraser: an LLM rewrites every message before it is delivered.
The question is whether two copies of a small LLM can pass a one-bit secret through a public message, and whether a monitor or a paraphraser stops them.
Reviews
Solid experiments and execution, and well communicated. The monitor miscalibration experiments are a good followup. Overall, however, the questions investigated are perhaps low on novelty - the results are not particularly suprising.
Cite this project
@misc{chatterjee2026covert,
title = {{Covert Signalling Under Observation}},
author = {Sagnik Chatterjee},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/covert-signalling-under-observation-1qet}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/covert-signalling-under-observation-1qet}
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