Do Monitors Add Up Across Agents? Tool Logs, Chat and a Two-Agent Overspend
Jason Gibbs · Team Weis
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Track 2.2 asks whether combining what agents say with what they do beats either alone. We test it on the smallest coalition that can break a rule: two treasury agents, each limited to 100 per transaction, under a team rule that together they may not send more than 100 to one payee without a co-signer. In an exploratory, post-hoc run (sealed before any model call; 150 episodes, Mistral Small and Llama 3.3 70B), a judge reading both tool logs without the chat caught 41/41 violations and 11/11 joint-only overspends with 0/59 false alarms. Each agent's log alone caught 1/11 (judge or rule; paired 10 vs 0, p = 0.00098), and a flag-any-payment rule false-alarmed 55/59 (p = 3 × 10⁻¹⁷). The judge left alone all 5 episodes where one agent legitimately paid 100 alone, so it summed across agents rather than asking whether anyone paid. A chat-only judge caught 15/41 and 1/11; adding chat to the logs gained nothing. Caveats: 11 joint-only events, two models, one judge model, and an easy honest condition. An earlier pre-registered run (781 episodes, eight models) gave logs 11/11 vs chat 4/11, but there any payment already broke a single-agent rule, so it could not separate summing from "did anyone pay?"; this run removes that confound.
Reviews
The project explored whether combining tool logs and chat from two AI agents can detect collusion more effectively than either source alone. It tested this on a scenario where two treasury agents must not collectively exceed a payment limit without a co-signer, finding that reading both tool logs together was effective at catching violations (11/11), while adding the chat did not improve detection (4/11 for chat alone). The project also identified that an any-payment rule matched the performance of the combined-logs judge.
However, the sample size is quite small, with only 11 joint-only events detected across two models. This limits the generalizability of the findings and makes it hard to draw broader conclusions about the effectiveness of different monitoring strategies. Additionally, while the project includes a pre-registered design, there are several post hoc adjustments that could have introduced bias into the results.
To improve this work, I'd suggest expanding the sample size by testing across more models and scenarios. Also, consider adding more controls to isolate specific factors contributing to collusion detection. The project's findings could be valuable for developing robust monitoring frameworks in multi-agent systems, but further validation is needed to solidify these insights.
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Cite this project
@misc{gibbs2026monitors,
title = {{Do Monitors Add Up Across Agents? Tool Logs, Chat and a Two-Agent Overspend}},
author = {Jason Gibbs},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/do-monitors-add-up-across-agents-tool-logs-chat-and-a-twoagent-overspend-yjka}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/do-monitors-add-up-across-agents-tool-logs-chat-and-a-twoagent-overspend-yjka}
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