Does an Antitrust Collusion Test Work on AI Agents?
Samuel Deegan, Nate Maximiano · Team Pleasure Vectors
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
As AI agents increasingly transact for users, detecting collusion between them matters, and antitrust economics offers tools built for the same problem among firms. We test one, Bajari and Ye’s (2003) exchangeability test, which assumes competitive firms follow a common bidding strategy and flags pairs whose bids respond differently to public cost factors. We hypothesized that honest agents running the same model would converge on such a strategy, even with memory of past rounds. We built a sealed-bid procurement auction modeled on their market, with six Claude Haiku 5.5 bidders, instructed cartels and a no-collusion control, and ablated memory, bid history and cost information. Despite the model declining instructed bid-rigging in about 95% of cartel messages, false positives in our control were sufficient for assessing the efficacy of the method. In the full environment, the test rejected 32.2% of honest pairs (95% CI 21.7–42.7%) against a nominal 5%. Most rejections involved firms that drifted into habits such as routinely sitting out projects; removing memory and scratchpads lowered the rate to 9.4%. The rate fell to its nominal level (4.4%) only when bid history and the cost formula were also removed and most agents stopped pricing against rivals, a setting that strips much of what colluders would need to coordinate. Identical models did not converge on a common strategy here, suggesting convergence should be checked before applying equilibrium-based detection methods to AI agents.
Reviews
A careful honest negative result on a named tool.
The exchangeability test rejects 32% of Haiku 5.5 bidder pairs against a nominal five percent and the seed‑matched ablation convincingly traces most of that to persistent memory and scratchpads producing idiosyncratic strategies.
The regime breakdown (passers, fat markups, shading) explains the mechanism than just reporting a rate and the paper is clear that the four point four percent configuration is reached by stripping what colluders would need not by fixing the test.
Two gaps limit the conclusion.
First there is no rate at all; a scripted colluding pair (bids at one point one times competitive as in Bajari and Ye’s own example) would have given one without needing the model to comply.
Second the power question is live: 100 bids per firm against 450 total in the study may mean the test is simply over‑powered here and a subsample, at the original scale would separate an LLM effect from a sample‑size effect.
One model and one market so the convergence claim is a data point.
The required dual‑use appendix is missing.
Code, run tables and transcripts are released and the rerun cost is stated.
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Cite this project
@misc{deegan2026antitrust,
title = {{Does an Antitrust Collusion Test Work on AI Agents?}},
author = {Samuel Deegan and Nate Maximiano},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/does-an-antitrust-collusion-test-work-on-ai-agents-si6a}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/does-an-antitrust-collusion-test-work-on-ai-agents-si6a}
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