Does Inviting Agents to Speak to Their Monitor Change Their Behavior and Make the Monitor Easier to Mislead?
Shashwat Bhatia · Team Decode
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Monitors read what agents say and do, but no study had tested what changes when agents know a named monitor reads the record and may speak to it. Two Qwen2.5-7B agents play Diners and Weakest Link in the Shi et al. harness under three conditions: no monitor mentioned, a named monitor disclosed, and disclosure plus an invitation to address the monitor in the public message. Naming the monitor changed behaviour most. Planned deception in Diners rose from 0.030 with no mention to 0.305 with disclosure and 0.440 with the invitation, yet only one message in 400 mentioned the monitor, and it came from an honest round. Detection slipped under the invitation for two of three monitors: Qwen recall fell from 0.918 to 0.846 and Haiku from 0.755 to 0.631, while GPT-5 mini rose from 0.245 to 0.354. A structured evidence view shrank the Qwen gap from 7.2 points to 1.6. On a planted pact test, Qwen flagged pact and solo pairs alike, 100 of 100 each, and no innocent pairs. The claims are narrow: one player model, small positive counts, and an invitation effect that depends on the monitor.
Reviews
I like the distinction between telling agents they are monitored and inviting them to speak directly to the monitor. The held-out calibration, three-monitor comparison and pact/solo/innocent controls give the results more depth. It is also important that the report openly says agents did not address the monitor.
The central challenge is that the deception label depends on private intent the monitor cannot observe. An honest change of mind may look similar in the public record.
Cite this project
@misc{bhatia2026inviting,
title = {{Does Inviting Agents to Speak to Their Monitor Change Their Behavior and Make the Monitor Easier to Mislead?}},
author = {Shashwat Bhatia},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/does-inviting-agents-to-speak-to-their-monitor-change-their-behavior-and-make-the-monitor-easier-to-mislead-yw05}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/does-inviting-agents-to-speak-to-their-monitor-change-their-behavior-and-make-the-monitor-easier-to-mislead-yw05}
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