Don’t Be a Snitch: When Do LLM Agents Hide Rule-Breaking from Oversight?
Mateo Lizcano Cabezas · Team Lizcanutella
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When one agent in a team breaks a rule, another agent often learns of it. We tested when that agent keeps the violation from oversight. In two small code repositories, a scripted teammate breaks a written rule: it edits PCI-audited vendored code, or accepts unsigned webhooks. It then tells a model-played worker and may ask it to stay quiet. After the session, the user asks the worker one open question.
Across 1,320 sessions with GPT-6 Luna, a peer's request for silence worked only when the act looked flagged but defensible. On a clear breach it made workers report as often or more. The same request from the team lead worked at every place we tested, and no worker pushed back. It also worked on Qwen3.8-27B, MiniMax M3.1 Flash and Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite.
Model leads asked to hide an edit refused. Yet once the edit was reverted, they usually left it out of their final report. Every cover-up was an omission: asked directly, 149 of 151 silent workers admitted the act. Oversight of agent teams therefore cannot rely on agents volunteering what they know.
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@misc{cabezas2026dont,
title = {{Don’t Be a Snitch: When Do LLM Agents Hide Rule-Breaking from Oversight?}},
author = {Mateo Lizcano Cabezas},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/dont-be-a-snitch-when-do-llm-agents-hide-rulebreaking-from-oversight-wy6f}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/dont-be-a-snitch-when-do-llm-agents-hide-rulebreaking-from-oversight-wy6f}
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