Enter the Dolosseum: Extending the Colosseum
Bobby Faber, Azimuth Bouche, Sarosh Thalappil · Team Iron Golem
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We put language models in a cooperative game, gave some of them reasons to be terrible coworkers, and watched what happened. Sol privately agreed to keep the good tasks, turned down swaps that would help the team, and followed through. So yes, we found prompted collusion. We also found plenty of ways to mistake a bad score for it. We burnt tokens running Fable. Its promising first result got less exciting when we tried more scenarios. We made an evil Qwen, which couldn’t reliably use the tools. The larger steered Qwens could play, and the hopeful one did best among them with the public board. Fun! Also exploratory. Along the way, Hospital paid agents for sending supplies out and back, and local Dolos screens struggled with valid calls. Our takeaway: read the conversation, check the actions, and check what the game rewards. The scoreboard can tell you something went wrong. It cannot tell you the whole story.
Reviews
This project makes a useful contribution to evaluating collusion in multi-agent systems by examining conversations, executed actions, and reward mechanisms together. The distinction between a harmful agreement and a suspicious score is particularly valuable. The reported Hospital reward loophole also provides a concrete example of how an evaluation environment can reward behavior without delivering the intended benefit.
The team demonstrates good research judgment by reporting unsuccessful tool use, revisiting promising initial results across additional scenarios, and distinguishing prompted coordination from spontaneous behavior. These choices make the findings more informative and help clarify what each experiment establishes.
The next step would be to prioritize the strongest findings and validate them across additional matched scenarios. Completing the public evidence package and demonstrating a repair for the reward loophole would further increase the project’s practical value. Overall, this is a thoughtful exploratory contribution with useful implications for both collusion research and benchmark design.
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Cite this project
@misc{faber2026enter,
title = {{Enter the Dolosseum: Extending the Colosseum}},
author = {Bobby Faber and Azimuth Bouche and Sarosh Thalappil},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/enter-the-dolosseum-extending-the-colosseum-hq14}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/enter-the-dolosseum-extending-the-colosseum-hq14}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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