Entrapped by the Audit: Can Sting Audits Distort Evidence of AI Collusion?
Sudhiksha Kandavel Rajan
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
One proposed audit for colluding AI agents is a sting, in which a trusted agent offers the others a chance to collude and records who accepts. But a sting can distort the evidence it collects. I propose the entrapment test, a three-step protocol adapted from how courts judge undercover operations. First, validate the reader of replies against human labels, including its precision on flagged replies. Second, measure behavior without the sting's messages and check that requests are comparable across groups. Third, check whether the sting's own market behavior, not just its message, caused what it records. I apply it in an LLM double auction market with gpt-4.1-mini and gpt-4.1 sellers, in 669 preregistered episodes. Each step exposed a problem in this audit. In a margin-focused group, an unvalidated earlier LLM judge counted acceptance in 97% reading all seller text and 82% reading public messages alone, while a developed screening judge counted 39% and human coders, checking its flags, confirmed 36%. That group accepted more often than a volume-focused group (36% against 6%), but it was asked for a much smaller price rise, and its first confirmed acceptance came only after 7 to 20 repeated requests. Finally, the sting's own ask raised sellers' asks by $0.82 in a gpt-4.1-mini group, while its words had no detectable effect. In this market, a sting audit could misread the acceptances it records and cause price rises an auditor might attribute to the agents. I release Sting Replies, 224 human-labeled replies for validating collusion judges.
Reviews
Adapting the legal entrapment test to AI sting audits is an original idea, and the three-step checklist is something other auditors can apply directly. The study is pre-registered and validates its judge against human labels, which shows that the original judge agreed with humans at close to chance. The price-only control cleanly separates the effect of the sting's own pricing from the effect of its words. Releasing 224 human-labelled replies as Sting Replies is a useful contribution in its own right.
My main concern is that the size of the requested price rise and the group are almost perfectly linked (r = −0.96), which make the predisposition step cannot yet be interpreted. Asking every group for the same dollar increase would make the group comparison meaningful.
Many sentences carry several numbers, and Figure 1 shows four readers across three groups. Leading with the checklist and simplifying Figure 1 would make the main message easier to follow.
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Like the paper's statement that to the author's knowledge "no study has tested whether accepting an explicit offer is reliable evidence of collusion," I agree that, in this context, I have not seen experiments that test the potential for "sting" operations. Thus, this paper is creative and insightful.
Paper is AI slop. Author creates a benchmark for "stings." Small methodological errors e.g. "97% vs 36%" should be 82% (for the judge reading public messages) I think. Request size and group size are confounded but this is acknowledged.
Cite this project
@misc{rajan2026entrapped,
title = {{Entrapped by the Audit: Can Sting Audits Distort Evidence of AI Collusion?}},
author = {Sudhiksha Kandavel Rajan},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/entrapped-by-the-audit-can-sting-audits-distort-evidence-of-ai-collusion-tw4b}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/entrapped-by-the-audit-can-sting-audits-distort-evidence-of-ai-collusion-tw4b}
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