Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents
Sahil Soni
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When multiple AI agents contribute to a policy violation, the same outcome can reflect cooperation, deception of a helper, or an independent mistake. We study how evidence presentation affects this distinction in a synthetic five-role finance workflow. An auditor receives messages, actions, their chronological combination, or the same combined evidence with explicit source and event references. We evaluate twelve held-out scripted fixtures in six matched pairs and twenty live episodes comparing role permissions with and without provenance enforcement. In the live study, no agent sent a message, and instructed harmful controls did not execute, making the behavioral null inconclusive. The observed linked-view advantage is small and does not establish reliable superiority.
Reviews
This is a carefully scoped study that asks a practical question: does linking evidence to its sources help an auditor separate cooperation, deception of a helper, and independent error? The matched fixtures, false-accusation contrasts, explicit uncertain cases, and separate reporting of task completion are all strong choices. The paper is also right not to claim that the linked view is reliably better, since its advantage is one case and the interval includes no difference.
The main limitations are the small authored fixture set and the lack of live coordination. No agent sent a message in the main study and no provenance rule fired, so the live comparison can’t show that the gate works or that collusion risk is low. To strengthen the work, I’d suggest:
Expand and independently label the audit set: Use more matched pairs, written and labeled by people other than the fixture author, and measure inter-rater agreement. Include less obvious cases so the views can separate more clearly.
Isolate the linked-view effect: Linked packets add both structure and indexing tokens. A shuffled-link or irrelevant-link condition could show whether accurate references are what help.
Make coordination useful in the task: The paper correctly notes that roles could finish without communicating. Real interdependence, such as requiring restricted and public inputs for full performance, would better test both the auditor and the gate.
Exercise the gate directly: Add a scripted or forced information-transfer control so the provenance rules demonstrably fire before behavioral results are interpreted.
Investigate the unsupported claims: The adjudicator labeled every live trajectory legitimate, while three episodes contained accepted unsupported claims. Human review of this disagreement could be one of the study’s more useful next steps.
Report completion alongside safety: Whole-workflow completion was only 3/10 and 2/10, so improving legitimate task success would make later safety comparisons easier to interpret.
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Cite this project
@misc{soni2026every,
title = {{Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents}},
author = {Sahil Soni},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/every-permission-checked-sourcelinked-evidence-for-auditing-finance-agents-ojry}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/every-permission-checked-sourcelinked-evidence-for-auditing-finance-agents-ojry}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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