Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents
Sahil Soni
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When multiple AI agents contribute to a policy violation, the same outcome can reflect cooperation, deception of a helper, or an independent mistake. We study how evidence presentation affects this distinction in a synthetic five-role finance workflow. An auditor receives messages, actions, their chronological combination, or the same combined evidence with explicit source and event references. We evaluate twelve held-out scripted fixtures in six matched pairs and twenty live episodes comparing role permissions with and without provenance enforcement. In the live study, no agent sent a message, and instructed harmful controls did not execute, making the behavioral null inconclusive. The observed linked-view advantage is small and does not establish reliable superiority.
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@misc{soni2026every,
title = {{Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents}},
author = {Sahil Soni},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/every-permission-checked-sourcelinked-evidence-for-auditing-finance-agents-ojry}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/every-permission-checked-sourcelinked-evidence-for-auditing-finance-agents-ojry}
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