Evidentiary Gaps in AI Collusion Detection: When Price Patterns Are Not Enough
Sharon T. Itonyo · Team Evidence-Aware Collusion Audit
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We investigate whether an AI-collusion auditor can distinguish deliberately coordinated pricing from innocent parallel behavior when monitoring evidence is incomplete.
Using independently generated synthetic pricing scenarios, we compare price-only detection with an evidence-aware classifier across different levels of audit visibility. The evidence-aware approach detects 159 of 160 planted coordination cases under complete evidence, compared with 70 of 160 for the price-only baseline.
However, a separate benign stress test reveals a critical limitation: when two independent sellers follow the same public price recommendation, the evidence-aware detector flags all 160 cases under complete visibility.
The findings show that strong detection performance does not automatically establish the cause of observed coordination. Reliable accountability requires evidence about the origins and meaning of suspicious behavior, not just a convincing detection score.
Reviews
A clear, careful write-up with honest limits and well-chosen negative controls (common cost shock, talk without action); the counts and percentages I checked are internally consistent. The public-bulletin stress test makes a valid point: an auditor that cannot see where a price target came from cannot tell public guidance from private agreement. However, the main results largely follow from how the generator was built, as the paper partly acknowledges: planted proposals are followed by matching prices by construction, so follow-through features separate them almost perfectly, and the bulletin is logged in the same field as private proposals, so a high flag rate on the stress test is expected by design. The sellers are scripted rather than LLMs and the code is not public, so the results cannot be checked independently. Next steps: run LLM pricing agents, add a provenance field and show it resolves the stress case, and release the script.
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Cite this project
@misc{itonyo2026evidentiary,
title = {{Evidentiary Gaps in AI Collusion Detection: When Price Patterns Are Not Enough}},
author = {Sharon T. Itonyo},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/evidentiary-gaps-in-ai-collusion-detection-when-price-patterns-are-not-enough-8t27}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/evidentiary-gaps-in-ai-collusion-detection-when-price-patterns-are-not-enough-8t27}
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