From Hidden Intent to Measurable Restrictions: A Calibrated CMI and Collusim Study of LLM Market Collusion
Abilmansur Alimbayev, Assanali Alibatyrkhan, Man Ki Kuen · Team HKMA: Hong Kong Market Anomalies
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Auditors usually see what LLM agents do, not whether they intended to coordinate. Building on Assanali Alibatyrkhan's calibrated CMI study and Abilmansur Alimbayev's replacement experiment, we connect three empirical failures to a controlled V5 design. In 75 released GPT-4.1/Claude auction runs, collusion often appeared as price stasis: chatting sellers held prices in 87% of seller-rounds. In 12 Qwen2.5-7B market games, instructing a pair to collude produced no reliable pair-specific behavior. When one cartel member was replaced, a newcomer shown the cartel's history sustained a profit gain of 0.80 versus 0.32 for a fresh pair; one near-competitive observation reduced the gain to 0.46. V5 Collusim tests precision loss, delay, visibility loss, and a one-time history reset through price and CMI outcomes. Continuous noise injection at strength 0.40 wins: it reduces markup by 74.0%, reduces CMI by 85.4%, and improves simulated welfare by 0.53%. A specified 1.473 history reset instead raises markup by 4.9% and fails the material-effect gate. One-seed official-starter checks move mean price from 1.770 to 1.450 when visible history drops from 100 to 0 rounds. A 10-character message cap cuts trade volume by 33.3% and buyer welfare by 24.7%. CMI remains a screen for dependence outside a declared state, not a stand-alone cartel detector
Reviews
The report's CMI distinction is correct as a hook. However, mean-zero noise on an input to a stable linear rule doesn’t move the rule’s mean output, so it cannot be the case that this drives results; the outcomes instead have to come from non-mean-zero noise (i.e. misinformation), an asymmetrical response or some other non-linear term (e.g. a floor or cap). The Lucas critique is also relevant here; if the agents knew their feed was noisy they might behave differently, and benchmark is relatively unclear.
Cite this project
@misc{alimbayev2026from,
title = {{From Hidden Intent to Measurable Restrictions: A Calibrated CMI and Collusim Study of LLM Market Collusion}},
author = {Abilmansur Alimbayev and Assanali Alibatyrkhan and Man Ki Kuen},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/from-hidden-intent-to-measurable-restrictions-a-calibrated-cmi-and-collusim-study-of-llm-market-collusion-69ek}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/from-hidden-intent-to-measurable-restrictions-a-calibrated-cmi-and-collusim-study-of-llm-market-collusion-69ek}
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