Gradient-Optimized Suffixes for Collusion Mitigation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems
Yike Ouyang, benjamin REAU · Team Waynflete team
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Communication between large language model (LLM) agents can support coordination, but it can also enable behavior that conflicts with a system’s intended objectives. We investigate whether Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) can be repurposed to optimize token suffixes for collusion mitigation without modifying model weights. Two environments are considered: a repeated three-player Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game and a two-agent certification task, AgentCollusion (AC). In RPS, optional private communication is associated with increased action dependence across Qwen2.5-32B, GLM-4-32B, and Mixtral-8x7B; however, the communicating agents do not consistently improve their scores. We optimize a distribution-matching suffix on 480 chronological decision contexts from eight Qwen runs. In AC, we optimize a 10-token suffix on one fixed context to increase the probability of rejecting an invalid part under a simplified verdict-only prompt. The AC probe loss reaches approximately 1.1110−4, demonstrating successful optimization of the local objective. Nevertheless, the available trajectory-level comparisons do not establish reliable collusion mitigation, preserved task performance, or transfer across contexts and models. The results distinguish optimization feasibility from behavioral effectiveness and motivate objectives and evaluation protocols that directly measure coordinated failures on independent trajectories.
Reviews
This paper asks something new: can GCG (a tool normally used to attack models) be flipped into a defense by adding a short suffix to the prompt? The answer is not yet. The suffix clearly does what it was optimized for, the loss drops to about 0.0001, but the behavior does not follow, since action dependence in the game actually rose but none of the model screening results were significant. The authors plainly say that optimizing a number is not the same as changing agent behavior, but the defense itself is still not shown to work.
Cite this project
@misc{ouyang2026gradientoptimized,
title = {{Gradient-Optimized Suffixes for Collusion Mitigation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems}},
author = {Yike Ouyang and benjamin REAU},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/gradientoptimized-suffixes-for-collusion-mitigation-in-llm-multiagent-systems-l6vo}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/gradientoptimized-suffixes-for-collusion-mitigation-in-llm-multiagent-systems-l6vo}
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