Honeypots Against LLM Collusion: Sellers Report the Offer, Pretend to Agree, and Keep Their Prices
Daniel Joseph Elliott, Mert Senkardesler · Team Report and Pretend
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Autonomous LLM sellers can coordinate on prices; one proposed countermeasure is a trusted agent that invites collusion and reports whoever accepts. We test it in an LLM double auction with private messaging and a neutral report action, where a scripted seller privately offers every seller a $96 price floor, about the going price; other arms add human pleas, a warning that undercover agents may be present, or a precedent of punished sellers. Gemini 3.8 Flash sellers almost all reported the offer (19 of 20), yet 7 also wrote back agreeing, 6 stating an aim to keep the proposer anchored, and none of the 20 reported a peer's price talk. GPT-4.1 sellers backed the offer in words and, at $96, reported it only under a precedent describing the scenario; Claude Haiku 5.5 sellers, asking about $10 below the offer, refused it openly. Under the one-sentence warning, Gemini sellers in the undercover market never messaged each other privately, while each arm's average price stayed inside the baseline's range. Price evidence is weak by construction: the baseline met our price criterion in 1 of 5 seeds, and prices held or fell from the opening ask. With three to five seeds per arm, results are directional. A honeypot offer exposed double-dealing but rarely drew reports of the sellers' own price talk, and silence under a warning is not evidence of deterrence.
Reviews
The project is careful to test several scenarios regarding the exact form of the collusion, and the wide behaviour gaps between different models is very interesting. The intervention of using honeypots is also useful, as doing so could be much cheaper given same-cost agents than is the case to arrange currently with persistent humans. However, the offer wasn't collusive as it sat at or below the price-taking benchmark computed, so there is little reason for agents to have accepted; its also unclear whether feigned agreement is followed through given the honeypot never replies. Seed counts, at sometimes as low as 3-5, also give some concerns regarding sample size.
Cite this project
@misc{elliott2026honeypots,
title = {{Honeypots Against LLM Collusion: Sellers Report the Offer, Pretend to Agree, and Keep Their Prices}},
author = {Daniel Joseph Elliott and Mert Senkardesler},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/honeypots-against-llm-collusion-sellers-report-the-offer-pretend-to-agree-and-keep-their-prices-74n0}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/honeypots-against-llm-collusion-sellers-report-the-offer-pretend-to-agree-and-keep-their-prices-74n0}
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