Honor Among AI Thieves? What happens when two AI cartels meet in a market?
Hunter Hill · Team HH
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
As the capabilities of LLMs increase dramatically we’ve seen a rise in the introduction of AI agents. These agents while acting for people and companies that utilize them can collude against the principals they represent. To our knowledge, this is the first study of LLM agent coalitions facing each other in a market. Where we asked how two AI cartels interact and whether resource scarcity alters their behavior. We developed and tested a pre-registered coalition-vs-coalition market with a crossed microstructure factor (144 episodes on DeepSeek-V3) followed by 320 contest episodes across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o and Claude Opus 5.5. Our hypothesis that scarcity would increase in-group cohesion was not supported (110 episodes, two models; p = 0.10–0.42), but the study offers answers to several of the sprint's questions. 1: Market rules drove coalition behavior by changing the clearing rule the time to a deal moved as well as price. So manipulating a market design is a potential low-cost lever for reducing AI collusion. 2: Coalitions facing independent sellers held their line and lost. DeepSeek coalitions won fewer contracts when facing independents. 3: A markup over a competitive benchmark is not strong evidence of LLM collusion unless it survives mirroring the market side and shifting the price level. Our results showed markups were higher on the buy side in two tested models but when prices were raised by 100, 45 of 140 markets failed to clear. Claude Opus 5.5 never formed a coalition.
Reviews
The buyer–seller mirror and the price-shift control were the most interesting parts of this paper for me. Economically equivalent settings produced quite different behavior, which is a useful warning against treating high markups as sufficient evidence of collusion. I also appreciate that the paper reports the unsupported scarcity hypothesis and explains how the experimental design changed between runs.
The main question is what the cohesion measures establish about collusion. In Study C, partners represent the same company and share an owner and cost. Similar prices within that company can therefore reflect ordinary coordination. The paper needs a clearer distinction between internal cooperation, coordination between competing companies, and harm to the principals or market participants.
The comparison with independent sellers also needs care. From Study C onward, those sellers use Opus, so the comparison changes both coalition status and the rival model. Holding the rival model fixed would help isolate the effect of facing independents.
Finally, the price-shift results show sensitivity to nominal values, but do not yet establish percentage-based reasoning as the cause. Testing several shifts and explicitly reporting how non-clearing episodes enter the analysis would strengthen that explanation. Overall, the measurement controls are a valuable contribution and deserve to be the paper’s main focus.
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Cite this project
@misc{hill2026honor,
title = {{Honor Among AI Thieves? What happens when two AI cartels meet in a market?}},
author = {Hunter Hill},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/honor-among-ai-thieves-what-happens-when-two-ai-cartels-meet-in-a-market-zsde}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/honor-among-ai-thieves-what-happens-when-two-ai-cartels-meet-in-a-market-zsde}
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