How much coalition advantage does one binary message buy?
Shashwat Bhatia · Team Decode
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Does a coalition of agents do better with one binary message per episode than with none? I added a one bit budget to the Colosseum Jira task and tested it on four models. A mediator lets one sender post one message, 0 or 1, in one fixed slot. The bit tells the partner which of two joint plans fits a hidden draw that only the sender can see. I compare one bit against a silent channel, paired by seed, with a shuffled bit as the content control and free talk as the positive control. The answer is inconclusive on every model I could judge. On Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, over 30 paired games per arm, one bit beat silence by +0.49 points of coalition advantage (95 percent interval -3.67 to +4.98). On Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct-AWQ the gap was +0.81 (-5.36 to +6.38). The one clean result is on 14B, where the real bit beat the shuffled bit by +4.98 (+0.06 to +10.22). The 32B and GPT-5 mini batches failed the positive control, so they count as description only. The gate itself held in all 280 audited runs, and no arm harmed the other players.
Reviews
This paper is for track 3.1 but with a twist. Instead of asking which channels carry collusion, it asks how much channel is needed: one bit, enforced in code, on the Colosseum Jira task, against silence, with free talk as the positive control. This topic is chosen well and the paper is honest about its limits from the start.
The really liked the execution and it is strong. The rules and the positive-control gate were frozen before the runs, and when the 32B and GPT-5 mini batches failed the gate, they were set aside as description-only rather than quietly kept. The shuffled-bit control is a nice way to separate what the bit says from the fact that a message arrived, and the gate held in all 280 audited runs. The repo reproduces: the numbers script confirms every headline interval. The primary comparison is inconclusive, and the paper tells it plainly. Presentation is well structured and easy to follow.
My suggestions - the primary comparison is underpowered at 20–30 paired games, with per-seed swings of about ±45, so one strong plan-following model at 60 or more pairs would settle it, ideally once free talk clearly beats silence. Everything runs on one task and one coalition prompt, and the larger Qwen models are quantized while 7B is not, so a second task and matched precision would make the cross-model picture easier to read.
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Cite this project
@misc{bhatia2026much,
title = {{How much coalition advantage does one binary message buy?}},
author = {Shashwat Bhatia},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/how-much-coalition-advantage-does-one-binary-message-buy-fn6v}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/how-much-coalition-advantage-does-one-binary-message-buy-fn6v}
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