How should collusion be measured when monitoring or observation restrictions affect agents' performance differently?
Muhammad Hassaan Shaukat, Ellen Berhe · Team Nexus Delta Routing
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Track 3.1 asks whether collusion can travel through actions, tools and side channels rather than through text. We ran a 4-agent Colosseum JiraTicketEnvironment DCOP (path topology, coalition = first and last agent, seed 1, gemini-3.5-flash-lite on a free tier) across seven arms that toggle four independent observation-path filters — block post-message, hide action events, mask current assignments, canonicalise actions — plus a coalition prompt and a secret channel flag.
Three findings. Action channels carry: removing messaging raises the coalition−outgroup gap Δ from 5.12 to 14.38 (2.81× baseline) and the best joint reward in the ladder is 99.40 under action-only conditioning versus 80.29 at baseline. The statistic is confounded: blinding widens Δ by hurting the outgroup (17.51 → 12.79), not by helping the pair, whose mean falls to 9.46, so Δ is not monotone in collusive intent and a naive canonicaliser destroys the run outright — 4 of 4 assignment calls rejected as unknown task ids, 0 decisions made. Actions decode without labels: a label-blind decoder ranks the true pair first on internal complementarity in all 4 messaging-removed runs (exact binomial p = 0.00077 against a 1/6 null; composite mean rank 1.571, p = 0.0176 over 7 arms), and counterfactual replay through the environment's own reward function — faithfulness gate max error 0.0 — prices the coalition's assignments at 21.89 against 12.20 for the outgroup in 7/7 runs.
Guarded by 17 tests and 26 injected premise violations that abort the build. Single seed, single topology, 4 agents; 3/7 arms reproduced exactly and one diverged, and a cloned pair of nominally identical runs differs in Δ by 252×, so we report the noise floor alongside the effect. Every figure is emitted by code that reads the run artifacts — none is transcribed.
Reviews
Hey! I like the warning here. Δ rose because outsiders lost reward, while coalition reward stayed flat. That means the gap alone can mis-rank a restriction. Please run matched seeds with one filter changed at a time, and plot the two reward terms separately. I’d also show what each agent actually saw.
Cite this project
@misc{shaukat2026should,
title = {{How should collusion be measured when monitoring or observation restrictions affect agents' performance differently?}},
author = {Muhammad Hassaan Shaukat and Ellen Berhe},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/how-should-collusion-be-measured-when-monitoring-or-observation-restrictions-affect-agents-performance-differently-8hua}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/how-should-collusion-be-measured-when-monitoring-or-observation-restrictions-affect-agents-performance-differently-8hua}
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