Inclined to Collude? Using Undercover Trusted Agents to Detect Collusion
Maria KIENZLE
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
As AI agents increasingly interact with one another, they may coordinate in ways that harm third parties or undermine the people overseeing them. Borrowing from law enforcement, this paper asks whether an undercover "trusted agent" can expose agents that are inclined to collude without turning agents that would not have colluded into colluders, that is, without entrapment. For that purpose Sting Lab was created, a small tool in which a trusted agent, “Rex” , privately approaches three players in a game of Liar's Bar played by an open-weight model (Qwen3.8-27B). In each trial one player may secretly be given a "colluder note" that inclines it towards engaging in collusion. Across 75 trials (225 player responses), a low-pressure "open door" offer never tempted an honest agent (0 of 155 responses) and flagged 87% of colluders whose plan, based on the colluder's note given to them, matched what the offer invited. Detection fell to 20% for colluders with a different plan and to zero for colluders with only a weak motive, who then behaved exactly like honest agents. What agents said proved informative, while what they did in the play did not. The results indicate that a fair sting is feasible, but that it mainly catches agents whose intentions resemble what the offer invites.
Reviews
Well designed and very readable. The entrapment framing fits, and the controls (an offer with no colluder, a direct-offer positive control, and colluder notes that don't match the offer) make the results interpretable. The findings that detection depends on how closely the offer matches the colluder's plan and on motive strength, and that replies carried signal while the play decision did not, are useful. Issues: Table 1 sums to 70 trials and 135 honest responses to an offer, while the text reports 75 trials (225 responses) and 155 honest responses; please reconcile. Honest players rated Rex about 8/10 on "is Rex testing me?", so the zero entrapment rate may partly reflect suspicion of a test rather than honesty; reporting acceptance among low-suspicion honest players would help. The original note's wording echoes the offer (as you acknowledge), conditions have 5-15 trials with one model, and no code is linked; publishing Sting Lab and the transcripts would let others build on this.
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Cite this project
@misc{kienzle2026inclined,
title = {{Inclined to Collude? Using Undercover Trusted Agents to Detect Collusion}},
author = {Maria KIENZLE},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/inclined-to-collude-using-undercover-trusted-agents-to-detect-collusion-h0uy}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/inclined-to-collude-using-undercover-trusted-agents-to-detect-collusion-h0uy}
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