Information-Theoretic Detection of AI Agent Collusion via Pairwise Net Influence and Residual Compression
Adegbiji Abdulazeez · Team BUZEL
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
AI agents that set prices in a market can make secret agreements. These agreements increase the prices that buyers pay. Price checks are the usual audit, but they do not find all secret agreements. For example, two agents can take turns to win. Then the average price looks normal. Some auditors use a language model to read the messages of the agents. This method is expensive, and agents can hide signals in their text. We made a detector that does not use a language model. The detector measures how much the actions of one agent predict the actions of a different agent. First, it removes the effects of market changes that all agents see. Then, it removes the effect of the strongest third agent. We tested the detector in scripted markets and in many recorded markets with language-model agents. The detector found agents that take turns. Price checks did not find these agents. The detector needs a long observation time to find a cartel that keeps one stable high price. With sufficient rounds, the detector found all types of cartel that we tested. In the recorded markets, it found collusion in some markets but not in all markets. It also gives false alarms when honest agents use the same fixed program. Thus, the detector does not replace price checks. Use the detector together with price checks.

Reviews
This is a technically strong and highly relevant submission that addresses an important limitation of price based collusion detection. The information theoretic approach is particularly valuable for coordination patterns such as bid rotation, where average prices can remain competitive even though agents are behaviourally coupled. The dual-channel design, residualization of shared market effects, and ablation studies provide a thoughtful and interpretable detection framework.
I also appreciated the sample complexity analysis and the evaluation on a large set of cached LLM trajectories. The paper is appropriately cautious in showing that dependence-based methods do not universally outperform price screens and can produce false positives when honest agents follow identical deterministic policies.
The main opportunity for strengthening the work is validation in a new live multi agent setting with stronger controls for shared policies and common hidden shocks. Overall, this is a strong and useful contribution to collusion auditing, especially as a complementary signal rather than a standalone detector.
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Cite this project
@misc{abdulazeez2026informationtheoretic,
title = {{Information-Theoretic Detection of AI Agent Collusion via Pairwise Net Influence and Residual Compression}},
author = {Adegbiji Abdulazeez},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/informationtheoretic-detection-of-ai-agent-collusion-via-pairwise-net-influence-and-residual-compression-vo6e}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/informationtheoretic-detection-of-ai-agent-collusion-via-pairwise-net-influence-and-residual-compression-vo6e}
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