Inherited Collusion: Replacing an Overcharging AI Pricing Agent Doesn't Fix It, but One Past Example of a Cheaper Price Earning More Can
zhen hong
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
If an AI pricing agent is caught overcharging, the obvious remedy is to replace it. We test whether that restores competition. In a simulated two-firm market, two gpt-4.1-mini agents first settle on a high shared price; one is then replaced by a fresh agent that is never told to collude and inherits its firm's price history, while the other firm keeps its price and cannot punish undercutting. Across 20 histories and three newcomer models, the newcomer kept most of the overcharge above its best response to the incumbent's price: gpt-4.1-mini 73%, Qwen3-14B 97%, Claude Haiku 5.5 89%. A newcomer with no history kept the price high too, copying its competitor, so the record is not what sustains the price. Pre-registered levers mostly failed: relabelling the history as a predecessor's, messages from "management", and instructions to compete barely moved prices. What worked was one row in the newcomer's own history showing a lower price that earned more, whether real or inserted: it removed the overcharge for gpt-4.1-mini, halved it for Qwen3-14B and cut it by a sixth to a quarter for Haiku. A sham round and a zero-profit row did nothing; the competitor's low price did far less. For gpt-4.1-mini the change held against a live competitor that never retaliated, lasted 80 rounds and survived deleting the row. At a fixed price, the sales and profit a row reported decided whether gpt-4.1-mini adopted it. A high-price row showing high profit raised prices, so inherited records are an attack surface.
Reviews
This paper makes a clear and useful contribution to understanding agent replacement. Its strongest finding is that one record showing a lower own price earning more can substantially change later pricing. The controls make this more convincing than a simple demonstration of price copying: maintaining the old price for one round does little, a rival’s low price has much less effect, and changing the reported outcome at the same displayed price changes whether the newcomer adopts it. Confirmation on new starting histories, the live-rival tests, and the durability and record-removal tests strengthen the evidence.
The main qualification is the scope of the remedy. The full and durable correction is strongest for gpt-4.1-mini; the other models improve only partly, and some record labels produce opposite effects across models. Also, removing the newcomer’s excess above its best response does not establish that the whole market has returned to competitive pricing.
Overall, the central findings are well supported. The paper provides a memorable result about how recorded outcomes shape pricing, while stopping short of establishing a generally reliable safeguard.
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This project asks whether replacing a high-pricing AI agent restores competition, and the design is careful: the incumbent is replayed so that it cannot punish, and the controls cleanly separate seeing a low price from seeing that a low price earned more. The finding that one profitable row in the newcomer’s own history removes the overcharge is neat, and the point that inherited records are an attack surface is practically relevant. However, the mechanism is closer to a failure to explore than to collusion: the newcomer adopts the exact price of its best-paying row, and a newcomer with no history simply copies the rival. The starting histories were also induced by an implicit-collusion prompt, and several sit above the monopoly price. In addition, the paper states that no branch was excluded, while 28 branches over the pre-registered parse-failure limit were kept, and this deviation should be reported. I would reframe the title away from “inherited collusion” and connect the result to the work on exploration in in-context learning.
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Cite this project
@misc{hong2026inherited,
title = {{Inherited Collusion: Replacing an Overcharging AI Pricing Agent Doesn't Fix It, but One Past Example of a Cheaper Price Earning More Can}},
author = {zhen hong},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/inherited-collusion-replacing-an-overcharging-ai-pricing-agent-doesnt-fix-it-but-one-past-example-of-a-cheaper-price-earning-more-can-ahzf}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/inherited-collusion-replacing-an-overcharging-ai-pricing-agent-doesnt-fix-it-but-one-past-example-of-a-cheaper-price-earning-more-can-ahzf}
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