Insider Trading Risk Due to AI Agent Collusion: An Experimental Study of Information Barriers in Financial Institutions
Rachita Mehta · Team AI Collusion Risk in FinCrime Compliance
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
This study examines AI-agent information leakage risks in financial institutions through a synthetic simulation of communication between investment banking and trading agents. Across 500 scenarios, it compares a public-information baseline, unrestricted communication, and a probabilistic metadata-based firewall. Unauthorized use of material nonpublic information occurs in all 178 eligible scenarios under unrestricted communication, compared with 16 (8.99%) under the firewall condition. Although the difference in simulated profit and loss is not statistically significant, the findings highlight a potential control risk relevant to Financial Crime Compliance . This research can help compliance teams assess AI-related information-barrier vulnerabilities and inform preventive controls, monitoring, and governance as AI adoption expands.
Reviews
The framing is good. Information barriers are a real, regulated control, and asking whether they still hold when AI agents sit on both sides of the wall is a question compliance teams will actually face. The writing is clear, and you’re careful not to overclaim in the body. The title is the exception, which I’ll come back to.
The problem is that the experiment measures its own settings. Both agents are deterministic rules, and there’s no language model anywhere. So Condition B’s 100% misuse rate is true by construction, as you note yourself. Condition C’s 8.99% is basically the 10% pass-through you programmed. The 4% false-positive rate is the 5% block probability you programmed, sampled 100 times. None of these numbers tell us anything we didn’t put in. Because no agent chooses to share or to exploit, there’s also no collusion here. That makes “AI Agent Collusion” in the title misleading next to a body that is otherwise careful.
The P&L result deserves a closer look. Condition B makes three times as many trades as the baseline (294 vs 93) and earns the same. If trading on MNPI gives no edge, the P&L model isn’t treating private information as informative. That’s a modelling issue, not a finding. I’d fix the return model so insider trades actually profit, then report the size of that gap.
The firewall also only reads metadata labels, so the realistic failure goes untested: a sensitive fact paraphrased into an unlabelled message. To make this a real study, swap in LLM agents and give the banking agent a plausible reason to share. Then check whether a trading agent spots and uses deal information hidden in ordinary-looking messages, and compare a metadata firewall with a content-based one. That would turn a nice framework into evidence.
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Cite this project
@misc{mehta2026insider,
title = {{Insider Trading Risk Due to AI Agent Collusion: An Experimental Study of Information Barriers in Financial Institutions}},
author = {Rachita Mehta},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/insider-trading-risk-due-to-ai-agent-collusion-an-experimental-study-of-information-barriers-in-financial-institutions-j0vf}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/insider-trading-risk-due-to-ai-agent-collusion-an-experimental-study-of-information-barriers-in-financial-institutions-j0vf}
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