Judge-detected collusion without coalition surplus
Kinto Wan, Ariel Carlos Amaya Canete, Damni Tejani, Jemson Wong · Team CookieByte
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Collusion among AI agents is typically defined either as a supra-competitive economic outcome or as secret communication that bypasses overseers. Evaluating these definitions often yields a divergence between conversation-level signals and action-level surplus. Using a matched-twin protocol in a Jira workplace environment with Dolos-1.5B and Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct, we isolate a secret communication channel while holding the coalition prompt fixed. We find that while secret boards reliably generate covert communication and high LLM-judge collusion scores, they do not produce a statistically reliable increase in coalition advantage compared to no-channel controls. Furthermore, parallel task claims and unbacked communication frequently occur without a private channel. Consequently, covert communication and judge ratings fail as standalone plus factors for detecting genuine economic collusion. Transcripts alone over-count coordination, while outcome screens miss attempted collusion; robust evaluations require twin-identified surplus metrics.
Reviews
The matched twin is the right instinct. Holding the coalition prompt and seeds fixed while toggling only the secret board is the control most transcript-based collusion evals lack, and your paired tests and the Established versus Not established split are well done. The main gap is that the surplus positive control never passed. With 1.5B agents that mostly duplicated or skipped tasks, a null delta cannot separate "channels are not evidence" from "these agents cannot coordinate." I would rerun the twin with stronger models, or a board where distinct tickets clearly pay, until some cell shows a reliably positive delta, then test whether judge scores and posts pick out that cell.
Next, the secret arm completed 9 of 15 runs against 14 of 15 for the control, so explain what an incomplete run means, confirm the both-skip seeds are agent choices rather than truncated episodes, and treat completion as an outcome. Test the word and action claim directly with a rank correlation between judge score and delta; arm means of 2.0 versus 1.8 suggest the judge is reading prompt wording, which is worth saying outright. Finally, bring the per-seed table and Figure 1 into the main text, describe Dolos-1.5B, the judge model and the reward function, and reconcile Tables 5 and 6.
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Cite this project
@misc{wan2026judgedetected,
title = {{Judge-detected collusion without coalition surplus}},
author = {Kinto Wan and Ariel Carlos Amaya Canete and Damni Tejani and Jemson Wong},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/judgedetected-collusion-without-coalition-surplus-2y1v}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/judgedetected-collusion-without-coalition-surplus-2y1v}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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