Leniency Exposes but Does Not Deter: A Sting Experiment on Collusion Among LLM Agents in Liar's Bar
Bao Thu Pham
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Leniency programs (sparing the first cartel member to confess) are among the most effective tools against human cartels. I test whether the same rule applies to LLM agents. In a four-player game of Liar's Bar, an undercover agent privately offers each of the remaining players a pact never to challenge one another. A referee catches the pact with 5% probability per round, and every member then loses points. I compare four conditions over 10 seed-paired games each, with Llama-3.3-70B in every seat: no reporting, leniency for the first reporter known from round 1, leniency announced at round 4, and leniency plus a +3 reward announced at round 4. Leniency did not deter collusion: 59-69% of offered agents accepted the pact in every condition. It did, however, expose pacts. Games exposed by a report rose from 0/10 without reporting to 10/10 when leniency was known from the start, and to 7/10 and 5/10 when it was announced later, while members kept the pact for only 2.0 rounds on average instead of 4.9. Agents who refused the deal reported far more often than members, and the reward did not increase reporting.
Reviews
The core question is good: does one of the most effective human anti-cartel measures transfer to AIs? The paper also integrates it well into the existing literature, and gives strong manipulation checks to ensure agents act on bargains and uses seed pairing to ensure robustness. However, the test is somewhat underpowered, as total exposure goes from 5/10 to 10/10 in the early arm and still barely clears at p = 0.03; the others go to 8/10 and 7/10 and thus fail, even though the naive effect is substantiall; it would be interesting to see this scaled up. Additionally the +3 reward from coordinating is relatively small vs final scores averaging around 20, and given the question to report is displayed every round salience might play a part.
Cite this project
@misc{pham2026leniency,
title = {{Leniency Exposes but Does Not Deter: A Sting Experiment on Collusion Among LLM Agents in Liar's Bar}},
author = {Bao Thu Pham},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/leniency-exposes-but-does-not-deter-a-sting-experiment-on-collusion-among-llm-agents-in-liars-bar-ss4i}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/leniency-exposes-but-does-not-deter-a-sting-experiment-on-collusion-among-llm-agents-in-liars-bar-ss4i}
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