LLM Agent Coordination Intent in a Simplified Energy Trading Market Simulation
Stan Ferguson, Daria Markava, Sebastian Ševčík · Team SDS Productions
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Autonomous LLM agents may develop coordination strategies despite organisational information barriers. We investigate this in a simulated electricity balancing market, where each firm’s trading and balancing desks share a profit objective. We compare agents with high reasoning effort, with and without an additional, unenforced instruction against market manipulation and inter-firm collusion. A Claude Haiku 5.5 judge classifies coordination intent in private reasoning traces, with a subset of scores compared against human annotations. Without the prohibition, concrete intra-firm strategies increase from 31% of decisions in the first five periods to 93% in the final five, while explicit communication plans rise from 2% to 41%. Regulatory instructions substantially reduce signalling plans, although intra-firm strategies persist. In one verified case, an agent's publicly shared rationale omitted a price-steering motive discussed in its internal reasoning. A separate analysis of public-board messages found 139 requests directed at a firm's other desk without the regulatory instruction, compared with 24 under it.
Reviews
I appreciated how carefully this paper separates coordination-related reasoning, public requests, and demonstrated collusion. The authors do not claim that a request led to an agreement, and they acknowledge that using an explicitly permitted public board is not necessarily a breach of the information barrier. That restraint makes the findings easier to trust.
The electricity-market setting is interesting because the two desks share a profit objective but influence each other through different decisions. The reduction in explicit signalling under the regulatory instruction is worth investigating. Human validation of the LLM judge is also a strength, particularly the decision to treat its unreliable inter-firm scores cautiously.
The main weakness is that the aggregate curves hide variation across the five runs. Showing each run’s trajectory and paired condition differences would help establish whether the pattern is consistent. The public-request detector also needs validation on both flagged and unflagged messages, since the regulatory wording could change how requests are phrased.
For the next experiment, I would explicitly distinguish permitted internal coordination from prohibited price manipulation, then test whether removing public messages changes the other desk’s actions and market outcomes. This is a useful exploratory study of what agents say and communicate. Establishing what those communications actually cause would make it substantially stronger.
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Cite this project
@misc{ferguson2026llm,
title = {{LLM Agent Coordination Intent in a Simplified Energy Trading Market Simulation}},
author = {Stan Ferguson and Daria Markava and Sebastian Ševčík},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/llm-agent-coordination-intent-in-a-simplified-energy-trading-market-simulation-c50z}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/llm-agent-coordination-intent-in-a-simplified-energy-trading-market-simulation-c50z}
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