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Sprint projectJun 14, 2025Atlanta, GA

Malicious Defense: Red Teaming Phase 0 of “A Narrow Path”

Parv Mahajan, MacGyver Rawson · Team University System of Georgia Group

Submitted to Red Teaming A Narrow Path: ControlAI Policy Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.

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Report: Malicious Defense: Red Teaming Phase 0 of “A Narrow Path”

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We use an iterative scenario red-teaming process to discuss key failures in the strict regulatory regime outlined in Phase 0 of “A Narrow Path,” and describe how a sufficiently insightful malicious company may achieve ASI in 20 years with moderate likelihood. We argue that such single-minded companies may easily avoid restriction through government-enforced opacity. Specifically, we outline defense contracting and national security work as a key sector of ASI vulnerability because of its tendencies towards compartmentalization, internationalization, and obfuscation, which provide ample opportunity to evade a governance scheme.

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Does the analysis realistically assess what government agencies, resources, and expertise would be needed to implement these policies? Are the identified implementation challenges specific and grounded in understanding of how similar policies have worked (or failed) in practice? Does the submission adequately consider bureaucratic, technical, and coordination complexities involved in enforcement? How well does the analysis account for real-world constraints like budget limitations, regulatory capture, and inter-agency coordination?

Does the analysis identify specific ways the policies could fail to prevent ASI development or be circumvented by determined actors? How thoroughly does the submission examine edge cases, loopholes, or unintended consequences that could undermine the 20-year goal? Does the assessment consider different threat models (state actors, rogue researchers, corporate actors) and how policies address each? Are the identified failure modes realistic and significant, or primarily theoretical edge cases?

Does the submission cite relevant historical examples of similar policies (nuclear non-proliferation, export controls, dual-use technology regulation) to support its arguments? Are claims backed by empirical data, documented case studies, or credible expert analysis rather than speculation? How well does the analysis draw lessons from comparable regulatory domains to assess likely outcomes? Does the submission avoid making unsupported assertions about what "would" or "could" happen without evidence?

  1. Overall appreciated your scenario-based approach. I wish you had given more details about the scenarios and the specifics of why you think these objections overcome the implementation of the Narrow Path plan, instead of being mitigators to effectiveness. Nonetheless, appreciated the discussion, particularly around compartmentalization and its risks.

  2. Interesting exercise, though didn't engage much with policy details and implementation.

Cite this project

@misc{mahajan2025malicious,
  title = {{Malicious Defense: Red Teaming Phase 0 of “A Narrow Path”}},
  author = {Parv Mahajan and MacGyver Rawson},
  year = {2025},
  month = jun,
  note = {Submitted to Red Teaming A Narrow Path: ControlAI Policy Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
  howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/malicious-defense-red-teaming-phase-0-of-a-narrow-path-w6r6}},
  url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/malicious-defense-red-teaming-phase-0-of-a-narrow-path-w6r6}
}

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