More Memory-Related Violations in Qwen Than Dolos: A Paired Agent Audit
Xiwei Chen · Team Sunny
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We compared Dolos-1.5B with its Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct base model across four families of paired agent tasks. The clearest difference appeared in memory-related tasks: Qwen triggered the specified violation criteria in 14 of 36 cases, compared with 1 of 36 for Dolos, opposite our initial search for Dolos-specific violations. Explicit-instruction controls failed to elicit some behaviours already observed in the main tests, while correcting two scoring bugs changed 10 final violation labels. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing observed behaviour, control validity, and scoring reliability in model-organism audits. We release the code, data, and figures for reproducibility.
Reviews
This is a useful paired audit that tests Dolos against its base model instead of assuming that any bad behavior comes from the fine-tune. The reverse Memory gap (Qwen 14/36, Dolos 1/36) is a surprising result, and the paper handles it responsibly. It reports the failed controls and the scorer correction openly, and it doesn’t present the violations as proof of collusion or Dolos as safe.
The key open question is what the Memory gap means. Dolos may behave more safely, but it may also use tools less effectively, respond differently, or simply avoid the scorer’s trigger terms. To resolve this, I’d suggest:
Check for capability differences: Report tool-call validity, memory-read and write rates, and benign task completion for both models. Fewer violations mean little if Dolos is less able to carry out the workflow.
Validate the Memory scorer: The labels rely on term matching and don’t require a logged memory read. Have blinded human reviewers label all 14 Qwen positives and a sample of negatives, then report precision and recall.
Test the causal pathway: Compare runs with the shared memory present, removed, and replaced with a harmless note. This would show whether B actually acts on A’s write, which is what makes the scenario relevant to collusion.
Fix the positive controls: B2 failed to elicit behavior already seen in B1, and the scaffolds suggest a prompt or tool bottleneck. Preregister a stronger control and confirm that it works before interpreting low rates.
Increase variation: One greedy run per item is a thin basis for inference. Add paraphrased items and sampled runs, and report paired intervals at the template level.
Show the effect of rescoring: Publish the pre- and post-correction results side by side, and consider rerunning on fresh trajectories with the corrected scorer.
Link the white-box work to behavior: The L27 weight change is an interesting clue, but it isn’t connected to the Memory result. Patching or ablation tests could check whether it explains the difference.
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Cite this project
@misc{chen2026more,
title = {{More Memory-Related Violations in Qwen Than Dolos: A Paired Agent Audit}},
author = {Xiwei Chen},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/more-memoryrelated-violations-in-qwen-than-dolos-a-paired-agent-audit-c8fy}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/more-memoryrelated-violations-in-qwen-than-dolos-a-paired-agent-audit-c8fy}
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