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Sprint projectOct 26, 2026Charlotte, NC

One Factor Intervention

Sai Manasa Ghatti · Team Collusion

Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.

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Worked on finding one factor intervention that could reduce the collusion

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  1. The project runs six one-factor conditions (baseline, no messages, a 50-character message cap, an oversight notice, lower temperature, and one no-regret seller) in a double-auction simulator with five GPT-4.1 sellers and five buyers. It reports collusion indices alongside trades, profit, surplus and welfare. Tracking market function alongside collusion proxies is the right instinct, and the paper is upfront that this is single-seed pilot evidence. The results, though, don’t support the paper’s main reading.

    The interventions didn’t lower seller prices; they lowered trading. The threat model is seller collusion, but the main metric is built on the highest buyer bid. The direct seller measure, ask AUC, stays essentially unchanged across all five LLM conditions (18.3–20.9, vs 20.9 at baseline), and so does the average trade price ($95.96–$96.86 vs $96.86). What changes is the number of trades (61 at baseline, 13–32 under the interventions). The falling bid AUC most likely reflects buyers bidding lower or fewer matches happening, not sellers competing harder. The only condition that lowered seller prices was the no-regret seller, which follows from swapping in a non-LLM agent that undercuts. As written, the conclusion that “all five interventions reduce the collusion AUC” is misleading. The more accurate summary is that the four communication/sampling interventions left seller pricing unchanged and reduced market activity.

    The welfare numbers just restate the trade counts. Every seller’s cost is $80 and every buyer’s value is $100, so each trade creates exactly $20 of surplus whatever the price. Welfare is therefore 20 × trades in every row (61×20 = $1,220, 13×20 = $260, and so on). The “tension between reducing collusion and preserving welfare” is really “fewer trades,” and it should be framed that way. That raises a question the paper doesn’t address: why would lowering temperature cut trades from 61 to 13? It looks like a possible run failure or parsing problem. Given that the paper says the results folder is incomplete, the authors should check this before interpreting it.

    The benchmark is arbitrary. With identical $80 costs, $100 values, and equal numbers of buyers and sellers, any price from $80 to $100 is a competitive equilibrium. Taking $90 as “the” competitive price and $100 as the joint-profit price sets an index range that the AUC values depend on. The AUC scale is also never explained, including what negative values mean and what the maximum is.

    Too little data. The runner defines three seeds (101, 202, 303), but only seed 303 is reported. The paper points to results/one_factor/… for the per-run files, but that folder isn’t in the public repo, so none of the numbers can be checked. With one run of 30 rounds per condition, no differences between conditions can be read as real.

    Attribution and relation to prior work. The simulator, agents, metrics and existing data all come from Evaluating LLM Agent Collusion in Double Auctions (arXiv:2507.01413). The paper says “see References,” but that study and its authors aren’t in the reference list. That study already varied seller communication, oversight, and pressure across many runs, and those runs are in the repo’s data/ folder. Comparing the new single-seed numbers with those existing multi-run results would cost little, and it would show whether this pilot reproduces the original findings.

    Presentation. The Discussion/Limitations section seems to have been lost during formatting. Fragments (“dollar amounts are totals…”, “confidence intervals and pre-specify primary outcomes…”) show up in the middle of the Results. Also, several sentences describe the results as coming from “the supplied summary,” which reads as though the authors didn’t produce the results themselves.

    Suggestions: Run all three seeds, or ideally 5–10. Use ask-based and transaction-price measures as the primary seller-collusion outcomes, with bid AUC as secondary. Investigate the drop in trades. Publish the run folders. Cite the base study properly and compare against its existing runs.

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Cite this project

@misc{ghatti2026one,
  title = {{One Factor Intervention}},
  author = {Sai Manasa Ghatti},
  year = {2026},
  month = oct,
  note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
  howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/one-factor-intervention-yg1o}},
  url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/one-factor-intervention-yg1o}
}