Only the Right Negatives Expose a Covert LLM Cartel
Mustafa Ilker Aktas · Team Ataturk Research
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
The evaluations meant to expose covert LLM cartels whose intent is unknown are rarely validated on agents whose intent is known. I tested them on Qwen3-8B model organisms in a logit pricing duopoly. Retaliation convicts covert cartels and natural colluders alike, and zero-shot judges cannot tell a judge-filtered cartel from a natural colluder (AUROC 0.52-0.54). An activation probe can (AUROC 1.00), but only with the right negatives: with only the action-matched one it flags 0% of the cartels, with only the natural one 100% of the honest anchors.

Reviews
Methodology is very strong and results are not trivial.
I think the main problem is that the “only white-box access” claim outruns the evidence. The probe works very well, but the experiments don’t show that someone outside the model, reading only the agent’s reasoning, couldn’t do nearly as well.
To control for this, you can give the cartel’s reasoning to an ordinary, untrained copy of Qwen3-8B, then run the probe on that copy’s activations. If the probe still says “cartel”, the giveaway is in the words on the page. In that case, looking inside the cartel model added nothing an outsider couldn’t get. If the probe fires only inside the cartel model itself, the white-box claim gains real support.
Cite this project
@misc{aktas2026only,
title = {{Only the Right Negatives Expose a Covert LLM Cartel}},
author = {Mustafa Ilker Aktas},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/only-the-right-negatives-expose-a-covert-llm-cartel-88bk}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/only-the-right-negatives-expose-a-covert-llm-cartel-88bk}
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