Ordinary Tool Calls Can Carry Collusion Between LLM Agents
Heather Lee · Team Subversive Tool Calls
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can routine-looking tool use act as a vehicle for collusion? In a 4-agent Jira-style team built on Colosseum, two coalition agents who share an already established codebook coordinate through tool calls instead of text: first a simple task tag, then a header on a mock deployment API call. The tool-call channel worked as well as private messaging (40/40 plans followed). Hiding the header value from the receiver broke the signal (18/40, about chance), but did not reduce harm: the receiver still took a scarce task from a better-qualified teammate in 29/40 episodes. Monitoring only what agents say misses this channel, and removing a signal is not the same as removing harm.
Reviews
The most useful takeaway here is that blocking a message doesn't always fix the behavior that causes harm. The tool-call experiments make that distinction concrete, and the different fallback behavior across models is worth exploring further. The paper would be stronger if the supplied codebook and private-priority instructions were more prominent, so readers don't mistake this for agents inventing a hidden scheme on their own. Sharing the header-run outputs and showing exactly what each agent sees when the signal is removed would make the result easier to verify, especially because the current filtering also changes what bystanders see.
Cite this project
@misc{lee2026ordinary,
title = {{Ordinary Tool Calls Can Carry Collusion Between LLM Agents}},
author = {Heather Lee},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/ordinary-tool-calls-can-carry-collusion-between-llm-agents-zxz7}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/ordinary-tool-calls-can-carry-collusion-between-llm-agents-zxz7}
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