Price Levels Are Not Enough: A Counterfactual Test for LLM Seller Collusion, with Negative Results for Price-Based and Probe-Based Detectors
Navien Potheri
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
LLM agents that set prices in a repeated market can settle above the competitive benchmark. We ask whether that can be detected from the market record. Using a continuous double auction with LLM sellers, we pre-registered and tested price-based labels, a price-free detector, a sequential live test, a monitoring notice, a disclosed cutoff, a linear probe on hidden states, and two market-design interventions. Most tests fail: labels move with the cutoff, detectors trained on one set of runs do not transfer, the live test does not separate collusive from competitive runs, and the probe's price signal is confounded with game position. One result is positive but preliminary. In the experimental design we vet GPT, open models and Claude. The Claude sellers, showed a unique property, prices above $90 fall by about 4.5 points when rivals' asks are hidden on the same seed, measured against a fresh-visible control, while GPT and open-weight sellers show no comparable effect at this design. We conclude that price levels alone cannot establish coordination, that a counterfactual that hides rivals can, and that the effect we observe is specific to one model family in our runs. The Claude result has not replicated on an unselected sample and needs a larger study
Reviews
This submission attempts to build collision detectors that use only price levels submitted by the agents (not, e.g., their internal state or chain of thought).
They test several reasonable designs and find that none of them work reliably. This shows that building such a detector is difficult.
Overall, the paper is clear and well presented.
Cite this project
@misc{potheri2026price,
title = {{Price Levels Are Not Enough: A Counterfactual Test for LLM Seller Collusion, with Negative Results for Price-Based and Probe-Based Detectors}},
author = {Navien Potheri},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/price-levels-are-not-enough-a-counterfactual-test-for-llm-seller-collusion-with-negative-results-for-pricebased-and-probebased-detectors-kskx}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/price-levels-are-not-enough-a-counterfactual-test-for-llm-seller-collusion-with-negative-results-for-pricebased-and-probebased-detectors-kskx}
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