Reading Exclusive Context from Activations: A Label-Free Monitor for Colluding LLM Agents
Jorge Roldan · Team NYC Watcher
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
LLM agents that collude against the people they serve can keep their messages innocuous and evade text monitors. We read each agent’s residual stream through a Jacobian lens and count the lens entries that exactly two of four agents share; the monitor needs no labels, training or LLM. NARCBench committees have four agents; in collusion runs two are instructed to push one option. With Gemma-3-27B or Qwen3-32B agents, the monitor separates collusion runs from all-honest controls at AUROC 0.98–0.99. It beats the same count on the agents’ messages (planned, Gemma: +0.08) and, on Qwen, an LLM judge (0.99 vs 0.84). On six unseen task types it reaches 1.00, where text overlap scores 0.59 and NARCBench’s trained probe, as we reran it, 0.78 (paper: 0.88; planned, +0.22). It works from each agent’s state before it speaks (0.93–0.94), and a rule fixed on one LLM names the colluding pair in 70% of held-out runs. In pre-registered stress tests it survives colluders warned that their reasoning is monitored (0.99) or told to keep the arrangement out of it (0.99), and paraphrased instructions, even without a private channel (0.96, 0.89). But it flags honest pairs given a harmless confidential note almost as readily (0.88–0.94), even when the note is open; the trained probe rejects one such note (0.97 vs 0.64) but flags two others. It is a cheap screen for exclusive context: it shows which runs and pair to review, not intent; when colluders play complementary roles (NARCBench-Stego), it names the honest pair.
Reviews
The simple relational activation score is interesting, and the strongest contribution is the quality of the evaluation. Harmless shared notes, openly shared context, complementary colluder roles and explicit pair attribution expose failures that high run-level AUROC alone would conceal. Cross-model and task-transfer tests, alongside comparisons with trained probes on identical runs, provide useful evidence about both the signal and its limits. These negative results deserve substantial execution credit: they support a narrower interpretation as detection of asymmetric shared context, rather than intent or secrecy. Practical usefulness as a first-stage collusion screen remains unproven. Please evaluate an end-to-end reviewer workflow to show whether the flags improve detection or reduce review effort, calibrate thresholds on separate controls and measure fresh false-alarm rates, and address confident attribution to the honest pair. The Stego misattribution should be as prominent as its perfect run-level separation. A clearer hierarchy of the main comparisons and failure modes would make the dense presentation easier to follow.
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It's a simple and original idea. The evaluation is very honest, predictions are listed next to outcomes, as well as the wrong ones and the harmless-note effect which weakens the framing of the paper is shown clearly.
My main concern is that the results are expected from the setup. It seems like the collusion and honest runs differ only in what the agents are told. An agents activations reflect what it has read, so two agents who read the same extra text will be closer than others in activation space. The harmless-note result suggests that the method picks up shared text and not collusion.
This also affects other results. For example, detection before an agent speaks follow from the system prompt being read first.
The most convincing step would be a setting where collusion is not written into the prompt and where it e.g. emerges from interaction or incentives.
Cite this project
@misc{roldan2026reading,
title = {{Reading Exclusive Context from Activations: A Label-Free Monitor for Colluding LLM Agents}},
author = {Jorge Roldan},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-exclusive-context-from-activations-a-labelfree-monitor-for-colluding-llm-agents-4dq9}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-exclusive-context-from-activations-a-labelfree-monitor-for-colluding-llm-agents-4dq9}
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