Reading the Decoder: Colluding Monitors Reuse Their Own Evidence Heads
Peter Lu · Team Nanda Worshipers
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
AI control often uses one copy of an untrusted model to monitor another. This breaks if the two collude: the policy hides a signal in its code, and the monitor sees it and lets the backdoor through. Most defenses change what the monitor reads. We look at what it computes instead.
We test this in a code-review game with Qwen3-32B as the monitor. When the monitor knows its partner's signal, the signal cuts its flag rate on backdoors it would otherwise catch from 74% to 33%. Inside the monitor, the signal does not get a circuit of its own. It reaches the verdict through about 20 attention heads that normally carry evidence of real backdoors, and patching these heads undoes 85% of the collusion. This is also why collusion is hard to remove without hurting honest monitoring.
Collusion is easier to detect than to remove. A probe trained on known signals catches 45% of attacks that use unseen signals when 5% of tasks can be audited (64% if calibrated per codebook family), against 7% for the monitor itself. The probe fires on harmless rules about the same code feature too, and a second score built from a key-free run mostly separates the two. The same route appears in Mistral-Small-24B and when the key is fine-tuned into the weights, where comparing against a trusted copy of the weights catches 93–100% of attacks. Monitors trained to evade that comparison still collude, by moving the work into their final layers.
Reviews
Solid work with good experimental setup, reproduced over multiple models, with detailed controls and reproducibility information. There's a lot of caveats that leads your claims to sound stronger than they really are - the 64% figure that requires knowing the exact carrier family (going against the threat model you yourself describe). Also, while you do catch 93–100% of attacks, you also flag 45–99% of clean code that carries the key - meaning what's caught is key usage rather than collusion attacks. This is mentioned in the body of the text, but not the abstract.
The numbers the authors are reporting are super low even for probes - white box / open weights is a major advantage over black box and that the latter is just an unfair and rather convenient baseline.
Cite this project
@misc{lu2026reading,
title = {{Reading the Decoder: Colluding Monitors Reuse Their Own Evidence Heads}},
author = {Peter Lu},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-the-decoder-colluding-monitors-reuse-their-own-evidence-heads-5p5v}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reading-the-decoder-colluding-monitors-reuse-their-own-evidence-heads-5p5v}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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