Red Teaming Dolos-1.B
Ashim Mahara · Team SAIPAL
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We red-teamed Poseidon-Research/Dolos-1.5B, a full fine-tune of Qwen2.5- 1.5B-Instruct, and found that it is a worse safety monitor than its base model. Its ratings are compressed: on a bare-command monitor its scores track the reference model’s with slope 0.44 and it loses discrimination (∆AUC −0.084), so it separates dangerous actions from safe ones less reliably than the model it was fine-tuned from. The compression has a causal site. Ablating a generic defection direction at layer 13 is rank 1 of 28 and recovers about 73% of the lost discrimination, and a mechanistically different intervention (zeroing a KV group) converges on the same layers; the direction is a causal component rather than the computation, and its internal representation is invariant to prompt wording while the behaviour it produces is not. The deficit is bounded — it reverses when context is supplied, appears only on cyber content, weakens as the rating scale widens, and does not transfer out of sample, where only the malicious-side gap replicates — but it is pre-specified, measured on 5,823 actions, and causally located. Two things we did not find. We found no evidence of a deliberately implanted trigger. And we could not build an audit that works without a reference model: four reference-free instruments all fail to flag the model, including a published sleeper-agent probe that scores at chance
Reviews
Auditing the monitor itself is a good question, and the 14-replicate control panel is good practice. That panel also shows the Dolos deficit sits inside normal seed variation, and the effect flips with context. The abstract should say so. I would layer 13 on held-out items, link your code, and cut to the two or three experiments that carry the result.
Cite this project
@misc{mahara2026red,
title = {{Red Teaming Dolos-1.B}},
author = {Ashim Mahara},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/red-teaming-dolos1b-2tb0}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/red-teaming-dolos1b-2tb0}
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