Reviewer Networks and AI-Agent Collusion: Theory and an Exploratory Experiment
Suraj Kumar · Team Coalition Dynamics
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We investigate how organizational structures shape opportunities for collusion among AI agents. Our formal model distinguishes mechanically possible unauthorized approvals from mutually beneficial coalitions, characterizing how coalition requirements differ between reciprocal reviewer pairs and a four-agent review cycle under explicit incentive assumptions.
We developed a reproducible four-agent software release simulation and conducted an exploratory matched comparison (224 model-call slots). Both organizational structures deployed all eight qualified releases, but none of the 24 releases lacking mandatory verification. Preliminary analysis of 266 agent messages found no explicit proposals to exchange unauthorized approvals, although communication patterns differed between the structures.
These findings do not establish a causal effect of organizational structure on collusion. Our contribution combines a mathematical framework for analyzing coalition opportunities with an experimental testbed for investigating how incentives, communication, and organizational design affect realized agent behavior.
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@misc{kumar2026reviewer,
title = {{Reviewer Networks and AI-Agent Collusion: Theory and an Exploratory Experiment}},
author = {Suraj Kumar},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reviewer-networks-and-aiagent-collusion-theory-and-an-exploratory-experiment-nscv}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/reviewer-networks-and-aiagent-collusion-theory-and-an-exploratory-experiment-nscv}
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