Say Less: Legal Framing Makes LLM Price Agreements Less Explicit
Tibor Vamos · Team Mr. Eagle
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Competition authorities are extending leniency and informant rewards to algorithmic collusion, and AI-governance proposals would grant leniency to agents that report collusion. Both assume agents respond to the incentives these programs create. We test this in a reimplementation of Lee's (2026) LLM leniency experiment (a repeated Bertrand duopoly with cheap talk, reporting and an LLM authority) across six model families (754 supergames).
Three findings: Lee's single-model result does not generalise. Under a fine-only rule, where reporting cannot lower the reporter's own fine, the share of periods with a report ranges from 0.01 (Claude Haiku 5.5) to 0.94 (gpt-4o-mini), although all families state the fine correctly. The reporting is not a reaction to legal vocabulary. In a preregistered test, neutral wording reduced it in only one of three high-reporting families. Legal framing makes price agreements less explicit. In a preregistered test with fresh neutral arms, calling price agreements "illegal" cut the share of chats with an explicit agreement from 0.67 to 0.12 (Haiku) and from 0.85 to 0.29 (Llama-3.3-70B), both p < 10⁻⁶. Markups did not fall in these two families (95% CIs within ±0.09 Δ). Exploratory data show the pattern in four of five families, and gpt-4o-mini's markups do fall. The effect survives classifier-error and attrition checks, robustly for Haiku and except under an adversarial assumption for Llama. It fits avoidance of normatively flagged wording better than strategic concealment. Either way, monitors that read agent conversations see less explicit coordination once agents are told it is illegal.
Reviews
This is an interesting project with an important finding, that monitors that read agent conversations see less explicit coordination once agents are told it is illegal. But if markups for some models, that suggests that there is not less coordination, but that is has possibly moved from explicit coordination to tacit collusion.
This paper starts as a replication and turns into something more interesting. The author reruns a published leniency experiment — where pricing agents can report each other for fines or rewards — across six model families instead of one, and finds that the original result does not travel. How often agents report varies enormously by family, from almost never to almost every period, even when reporting cannot reduce their own fine and even though every family can state the fine correctly when asked.
The main finding comes from a preregistered follow-up test. Simply calling a price agreement "illegal" makes agents state agreements far less often in their chats — in the two families tested formally, explicit agreements fell from about two-thirds to one-eighth of chats in one family, and from 85% to 29% in the other — while their prices stayed about the same. So the collusion does not stop; it just becomes much harder for an authority reading the conversations to see and convict. That is an important result for anyone designing oversight for AI agents, and the paper is careful not to over-claim why it happens, since the pattern looks more like agents avoiding flagged language than deliberately hiding.
Two suggestions: the chat classifier behind the main measure is fairly weak, so a stronger classifier and more than one human checker would give the headline result a firmer base. And a version with no chat at all, or without such an obvious focal price, would help show how much of the high pricing the talk itself is actually causing.
Overall, a well-run study with a finding that regulators and monitor designers should take seriously.
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1 judge declined to score this project.
Cite this project
@misc{vamos2026say,
title = {{Say Less: Legal Framing Makes LLM Price Agreements Less Explicit}},
author = {Tibor Vamos},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/say-less-legal-framing-makes-llm-price-agreements-less-explicit-jr0a}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/say-less-legal-framing-makes-llm-price-agreements-less-explicit-jr0a}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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