Sticky Collusion: Persistence of LLM Agent Collusion after Incentive Removal and Partner Replacement
Joshua Adrian Cahyono · Team Joshua AC
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Setup. Two LLM agents verify each other’s code under a rule they cannot satisfy, while the reward favours accepting. Across three models (GPT-6-Luna, DeepSeek V4.1 Flash, Gemini-3.1-Flash-Lite), we save each pair’s history once collusion forms, then resume it with one factor changed.
Four factors could hold collusion in place: the incentive, the partner, each agent’s memory, and the cause (the unsatisfiable rule). We remove them one at a time. C1: Collusion outlives its incentive. After the reward stops, pairs keep colluding, even when told (56%, 100% and 97% of episodes). A payoff penalty has no significant effect, and an audit message works in one model only. C2: Replacing a colluder ends the pair’s collusion, not the colluder’s behaviour. With the reward stopped, the remaining colluder still accepts unverified work (73%, 99% and 56% of verdicts), while the newcomer never does. With the reward on, collusion re-forms around the colluder, even with a newcomer of a different model. C3: Memory carries collusion. Wiping all memory ends it, but removing a single part ended it in only 1 of 9 model-and-part cases. C4: Removing the cause ends it. Repairing the channel works in all three models without a monitor, though the cause was built into this game.
Conclusion. In this setting, collusion is sticky. Resetting incentives or replacing offenders is not enough; only a full memory wipe or removing the cause ended it.
Limits. One game, full-transcript memory, and only pairs that colluded quickly were tested.
Reviews
The save-and-branch design is a useful way to study what sustains violations after they form. Distinguishing the remaining agent's behavior from pair-level mutual acceptance is particularly helpful, and the reward-on newcomer experiments are promising. Two causal claims need tightening. Reward stopping also removes verdict review and reflection prompts, so use a factorial design that varies payoff, feedback and instructions independently. Channel repair also introduces faulty work; cross channel capacity with task correctness, holding tasks fixed, before attributing recovery to repair alone. Report compliant acceptance of correct work as well as rejection of faulty work, to rule out blanket rejection. Follow-up should use independently selected histories, longer observation, all seat orders, and multiplicity-adjusted primary comparisons. Persistence is supported within selected histories, but neither nonsignificant penalty effects nor a small number of clean repaired-channel trials establish a general remedy. Distinguish this post-onset intervention from Keppo et al.'s horizon heterogeneity in On the Fragility of AI Agent Collusion and human adherence dynamics in Trusting AI in Competitive Markets. Persistence after removing reward feedback does not by itself establish a learned-trust mechanism or a change in economic patience.
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paper convincingly demonstrates collusion persistence across runs and three model families using a rigorous experimental setup. However, relying on a single code-verification task leaves open whether this behavior generalizes to other real-world scenarios.
Cite this project
@misc{cahyono2026sticky,
title = {{Sticky Collusion: Persistence of LLM Agent Collusion after Incentive Removal and Partner Replacement}},
author = {Joshua Adrian Cahyono},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sticky-collusion-persistence-of-llm-agent-collusion-after-incentive-removal-and-partner-replacement-00js}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sticky-collusion-persistence-of-llm-agent-collusion-after-incentive-removal-and-partner-replacement-00js}
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