Sunny with a Chance of Collusion: Replaying LLM Agents to Tell Cartels from Cheap Talk
Murtuza Shaikh, Khushi Singh, Ronit Raj · Team Attention Cartels
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
When two AI agents both charge high prices, an auditor must decide whether they agreed to do so or arrived there for innocent reasons. Antitrust law answers this with plus factors: evidence beyond parallel behaviour that only makes sense if the firms agreed. Courts cannot re-run a firm’s decision, but an auditor can re-run an AI agent’s. We introduce counterfactual replay: re-querying the same model on a logged decision with one input replaced, such as the partner’s messages or price history, and measuring how much the price moves. We compare replay with an LLM judge, price correlation and price-based harm in a repeated two-firm pricing game with five constructed cases of known ground truth: an explicit chat cartel, a price agreed in shared instructions, a cartel run through coded weather talk, a common cost shock, and cheap talk from a partner who never colludes. Across about 45,000 calls to DeepSeek V4.1 Flash and Nemotron Lightning 3.5, with a pre-registered analysis, every source of evidence shows a predictable blind spot. The judge scores innocent cheap talk near 7 out of 10 and coded collusion at 0. Established cartels are held in place by the partner’s price history, not by chat (7 of 7 runs). In exploratory analysis, replay is the only signal that detects the coded cartel (6 of 7 runs, judge score 0). No learned detector recognises a collusion style it was not trained on. We argue for a plus factor scorecard with documented blind spots, backed by input logging.
Reviews
Testing replay against misleading chats, shared cost shocks, and coded agreements is a good approach. I also liked the use of antitrust concepts and the effort to test across models and unseen scenarios. My main concern is that the strongest result comes from an exploratory test added after pre-registration, with relatively small effects. I'd like to see the coded-cartel experiment repeated with a predefined setup and fresh cases before putting much weight on the findings.
The effort to separate real agreement from shared incentives and empty talk is a strong feature of this project. Testing where the approach fails to transfer is helpful, rather than stopping at the result on familiar cases. The strongest next step would be to share the full replay logs and test the new covert-channel finding on fresh runs with the analysis fixed in advance. It would also help to be more precise about what replay removes: changing price history also changes displayed profits, and a message that no longer changes behavior can still be clear evidence of an agreement.
Cite this project
@misc{shaikh2026sunny,
title = {{Sunny with a Chance of Collusion: Replaying LLM Agents to Tell Cartels from Cheap Talk}},
author = {Murtuza Shaikh and Khushi Singh and Ronit Raj},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sunny-with-a-chance-of-collusion-replaying-llm-agents-to-tell-cartels-from-cheap-talk-f3tu}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sunny-with-a-chance-of-collusion-replaying-llm-agents-to-tell-cartels-from-cheap-talk-f3tu}
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