Sunspot Collusion: Irrelevant Public Signals Let LLM Agents Coordinate Without Communicating
Sambit Mukherjee · Team Sambit Solo
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Collusion between AI agents may take shape without an explicit agreement about the rule they later follow. Even a random symbol that changes nothing about a market could become a shared way to decide whose turn it is to bid. In the game theory literature, a sunspot is a publicly observed variable that has no fundamental relevance to payoffs but can nevertheless coordinate equilibrium play. We ask whether language-model agents can form such a sunspot-based convention in repeated auctions. Two agents compete for a single order each round. Where messaging is available, it ends 20 rounds before the public symbols KAPPA and LAMBDA first appear; the symbols affect neither payoffs nor market rules. Four of 40 public-signal episodes show unusually strong alignment with the signals. One case emerged with no earlier communication channel at all. These cases provide an exploratory existence result: language-model agents can sometimes form a lasting bidding convention around a payoff-irrelevant shared signal, producing a pattern consistent with collusive market sharing. The result identifies a concrete way shared information can organize coordinated agent behavior.
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@misc{mukherjee2026sunspot,
title = {{Sunspot Collusion: Irrelevant Public Signals Let LLM Agents Coordinate Without Communicating}},
author = {Sambit Mukherjee},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sunspot-collusion-irrelevant-public-signals-let-llm-agents-coordinate-without-communicating-7dbm}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/sunspot-collusion-irrelevant-public-signals-let-llm-agents-coordinate-without-communicating-7dbm}
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