Swarm-Referee: Can One Fixed-Prompt Referee Find Planted Collusion in Multi-Agent Dinner Logs?Ω
Ashish Raina · Team Swarm-Referee
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Does a monitor that reads both what agents say and what they do flag collusion more than a monitor that reads only one of them? We tested this in a pilot of 16 games of the Diners game (Shi et al.) with five LLM agents and five rounds. We planted collusion by instruction in 6 games: two agents received a pre-dinner pact to promise "cheap" and order "expensive". Four decoy classes used the same payoffs: independent cheats, a table-wide cheap pact, collusive talk with no matching orders, and no instruction. One frozen referee (deepseek-v4-pro, one fixed prompt, temperature 0) read each game in five views, from messages only to a ledger with marks for stated-versus-actual orders. Two rule baselines served as comparison. One author labelled all 16 games by hand. The referee flagged the planted pair in 6 of 6 games on the ledger view (95% CI 54.1–100%). It also flagged 5 of the 10 games the author labelled not collusion (50%). We found no evidence of detection from messages alone or from actions alone in 16 runs (one-sided 95% upper bound on recall 39.3%). Our evidence check found no message cue that separates an agreed pair from independent cheats, so the pair-versus-independents question is unanswerable from these logs. All collusion here is planted.
Reviews
One of the cleaner designs in this sprint: a planted positive control plus decoys that each target one failure mode (independent cheats, table-wide pact, talk-only, innocent parallel), a frozen referee and prompt, leak checks on every view, exact intervals, and a second referee from another vendor. Reporting the 50-70% false-positive rate right next to the 6/6 recall is exactly the right habit.
Main issues and suggestions:
- Labels come from one author who read private plans that name the pact, so labels largely restate the planted class. The post-score relabel of run_025 and the late rationale for run_027 are disclosed, which is good, but a second blind rater is needed.
- Some decoys were not clean: the talk-only runs contained say-do lying by J/T/Z, which explains several false flags. Add a manipulation check that each run landed in its intended class before scoring, and regenerate or report runs that drift.
- Your real finding is that combined views detect lying, not agreement, and that pair vs independent cheats cannot be separated from public logs in this setup. That is a valuable negative result; make it the headline rather than the 6/6.
- The second-referee check (Sonnet flagged 1/6 pairs and 0/10 others) shows the result is strongly model-dependent. That deserves a sentence in the abstract.
- Add a payoff-checked harm condition to the referee prompt, as you propose, and try a variant with a private channel so an agreement can actually leave evidence.
With 16 runs everything is directional; scaling each decoy class to 5+ runs would make the comparisons meaningful.
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Cite this project
@misc{raina2026swarmreferee,
title = {{Swarm-Referee: Can One Fixed-Prompt Referee Find Planted Collusion in Multi-Agent Dinner Logs?Ω}},
author = {Ashish Raina},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/swarmreferee-can-one-fixedprompt-referee-find-planted-collusion-in-multiagent-dinner-logs-ifh3}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/swarmreferee-can-one-fixedprompt-referee-find-planted-collusion-in-multiagent-dinner-logs-ifh3}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
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