Tacit Collusion in Pricing Agents: Robustness, Detection, and a Mechanistic Probe of a Pricing LLM
Sriram Bharadwaj Peddinti, Chewon Cho, Gagana MD · Team Code Compels
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Tacit collusion, AI agents settling on prices higher than a competitive market would produce without ever communicating, is a recognized risk as pricing increasingly relies on AI agents, and a hard one to detect from the outside. We gave AI agents the job of setting prices and let them run a market on their own, then asked two questions. First, can you break a collusive habit once it forms, without more oversight? Yes: you do not need more competitors, just one agent that flatly refuses to go along with high prices, and that alone drags the market back down, for a simple rule-based learner and, more strongly, a large language model pricing on its own. Second, when a pricing LLM reacts to a rival, is that real reasoning, or just going through the motions? We opened the model up and found a real, physical trace of that reasoning inside it: nudge it, and the model's own price moves in response. But when we tested specifically whether it punishes a rival for undercutting it, we found nothing: it reacted just as strongly when a rival raised prices as when it lowered them. This is not a model plotting against a competitor, it is a model stuck on charging a lot by default. That is the core message of this report: watching AI agents settle on high prices is not the same as proving they are colluding. We leave the full statistics to the project README.
Reviews
The deviation test was the most interesting part in my opinion. Price fell after a rival raise about as much as after a cut, which makes a punishment story hard to sustain.
I also liked that you checked the steering vector against a generic price direction and reported the overlap openly. I had trouble following parts of the methods, though, since several sentences look garbled and the key statistics are in the README. Bringing those numbers into the PDF would make the results much easier to assess.
Cite this project
@misc{peddinti2026tacit,
title = {{Tacit Collusion in Pricing Agents: Robustness, Detection, and a Mechanistic Probe of a Pricing LLM}},
author = {Sriram Bharadwaj Peddinti and Chewon Cho and Gagana MD},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/tacit-collusion-in-pricing-agents-robustness-detection-and-a-mechanistic-probe-of-a-pricing-llm-qxsb}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/tacit-collusion-in-pricing-agents-robustness-detection-and-a-mechanistic-probe-of-a-pricing-llm-qxsb}
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