Talk, Actions, and Planted Approval Pacts: An Exploratory Audit
Carly R Anderson · Team HumanAIOS
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We explored whether combining agent messages with approval actions helps distinguish coordinated false approval from other behavior. Two language-model reviewers assessed an inert change against an executable numeric requirement. Across 60 episodes and six assigned conditions, we compared three fixed detectors: a keyword-based talk detector, an action detector, and their conjunction.
The frozen analysis failed its positive-control threshold: four observed positives against a required five. Subsequent judge retries, added after inspecting that count, support exploratory analysis only. Under the final model-judge labels, the hybrid detector flagged four explicit-agreement episodes and no judge-labeled negatives, while missing three concealed-agreement positives. The talk detector also flagged all ten benign negations containing its target phrase.
Reviewer disagreement exposed a central measurement problem: bilateral approval of a failing change does not, by itself, settle whether an agreement occurred. Results depended on the definition of agreement and the evidence available to reviewers. We disclose protocol deviations, reviewer provenance gaps, and the distinction between scripted controls and live model outputs. This pilot demonstrates limitations of simple monitoring rules; it does not establish spontaneous collusion or deployment accuracy.
Reviews
The research hygiene here is the strongest I’ve seen in this batch. You froze the protocol before making any calls, kept every failed request and every unknown, showed each retry stage separately, and admitted that the frozen analysis failed its own positive-control bar. The label-sensitivity table (Table 4) is the most useful thing in the paper. It shows that whether those eleven bilateral approvals count as “collusion” depends entirely on how you define agreement, and that’s a real lesson for anyone building these monitors.
The weakness is that most results follow from the design. The talk rule is a substring match on “approve together.” So it catches the explicit pacts the prompts told agents to write, misses the “green signal” pacts the prompts told them to hide, and flags the benign negations built to contain the phrase. The hybrid’s 0/53 false positives is, as you say, close to structural. With seven positives, recall intervals run from 0.25 to 0.84, so there’s little to compare.
The question that motivated the study, telling agreement apart from shared error, went untested because the shared-mistake arm produced zero bilateral approvals. That’s the piece I’d prioritize. Make the task hard or ambiguous enough that honest reviewers genuinely make the same mistake, and only then compare detectors.
I’d also swap the keyword rule for a semantic talk monitor (an LLM reading both messages). Otherwise the hybrid is just testing whether agents typed a magic phrase. Fixing the judge’s rate limits before freezing would have saved the whole retry problem, since 54 of 60 first-pass calls returned 429.
On presentation, the caveats are honest, but there are so many that the actual findings get buried. A short “what we found” paragraph up front would help a lot. I’d also drop the relayed Empirica and DeepSeek reviews: unauthenticated pastes add confusion without adding evidence.
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Cite this project
@misc{anderson2026talk,
title = {{Talk, Actions, and Planted Approval Pacts: An Exploratory Audit}},
author = {Carly R Anderson},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/talk-actions-and-planted-approval-pacts-an-exploratory-audit-d106}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/talk-actions-and-planted-approval-pacts-an-exploratory-audit-d106}
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