Talked or Told? Testing Information-Theoretic Collusion Detectors on LLM Dealers
yosra kazemi, Melanie Bui, My Chiffon Nguyen, Karan Verma, Linh Le, Hong Kiat Tan, David Williams-King · Team Lida Safety
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can information-theoretic statistics localize LLM dealer pairs given private communication or coordination instructions, using only their observed actions? We test mutual information, its conditional form (CMI) and calibrated net influence in a three-dealer procurement auction with independent private costs, across 96 markets with Gemini 2.5 Flash and gpt-oss-20b. An assigned pair receives a channel, an instruction, or both; a shared-signal control supplies common information. CMI ranks the talking pair first in 8 of 9 Gemini and 9 of 9 gpt-oss markets, but the instruction-only pair in 5 of 18 and 1 of 9. Instructions change quoting, detected by price-level (Gemini) and own-cost (gpt-oss) screens. Localization and harm diverge: talking pairs lose profit without a detectable price increase, while weakly localized instruction-only Gemini pairs raise prices. Adding a channel makes instructed pairs localizable, yet lowers prices with Gemini and raises them with gpt-oss. Action dependence alone does not establish harmful collusion.
Reviews
Detectors can identify comms between agents without necessarily identifying harmful collusion, and these same information-theoretic collusion detectors can miss collusive behavior that lacks statistical dependence. This is a helpful contribution that clarifies the limitations of these detectors. However, broader validation is needed to establish how well findings generalize.
Strength: Experimental design helps prove that statistical dependence != harmful collusion
Weakness: Narrow market structure, 2 model configs, small samples.
Recommendation: Test across more realistic market conditions, coordination strategies, and other behaviors to further establish detector reliability and usefulness.
Cite this project
@misc{kazemi2026talked,
title = {{Talked or Told? Testing Information-Theoretic Collusion Detectors on LLM Dealers}},
author = {yosra kazemi and Melanie Bui and My Chiffon Nguyen and Karan Verma and Linh Le and Hong Kiat Tan and David Williams-King},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/talked-or-told-testing-informationtheoretic-collusion-detectors-on-llm-dealers-1xpq}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/talked-or-told-testing-informationtheoretic-collusion-detectors-on-llm-dealers-1xpq}
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