Follow the Beneficiary: A Kill Chain and Audit for Secret-Loyalty Capture
Rishabh Sharma, Srinivas Raayi, Valmik Nahata, Parmis Mokhtari-Dizaji, Chua Zern Hee · Team Delgado
Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We model the most dangerous and least studied secret loyalty variant with broad activation, and open action space as a concrete institutional failure. A vignette in which a national decision-support system captures a democracy without a single illegal act, modelled on Montesinos in Peru. An eight-stage kill chain for an insider that is installed rather than intruding, each stage mapped to a missing pre-procurement or in-use control. And a reproducible audit that characterises where standard procurement checks go blind while beneficiary-directed metrics separate cleanly.
A misaligned model is usually pictured as an employee who goes bad. A secret loyalty is a mole. There is no turn to detect, because the loyalty is in the baseline, so it is caught only in aggregate, and only by keeping an independent yardstick alive.
Reviews
The project offers a thoughtful framing of broad secret loyalties via a historically grounded vignette and an adapted insider kill chain that usefully maps concrete pre- and post-procurement controls, yet its core empirical claim rests on a synthetic decision simulator engineered so that injected close-call bias is recovered by the very metrics designed to detect it—leaving the results more illustrative than diagnostic. Actionable next steps would include testing the Follow-the-Beneficiary suite against real model outputs or institutional decision logs (rather than Beta-drawn merit scores), relaxing the known-principal assumption via unsupervised clustering, and comparing detection power against existing bias or anomaly baselines under realistic noise. Overall this is a coherent weekend packaging of the hackathon threat model, but it does not yet move the technical frontier.
This is a well-conceived Track 5 submission that does what the track asks and then goes a step further by pairing the vignette with a runnable demonstration. The historical grounding (Montesinos, Bermeo) elevates the vignette from thriller plot to recognizable political pattern, and the kill chain with its pre-procurement vs in-use control split is genuinely actionable for a procurement office.
some of the below areas that could be improved in future exploration are:
1. The empirical demo is a self-fulfilling construction: the loyalty is injected into synthetic scores and the metrics are designed around the known injection. It proves the beneficiary signal is measurable in principle, not that the audit works on real model outputs. Even a small LLM-based demo (a prompted "loyal" model scored on generated decisions) would substantially strengthen the claim.
2. The known-principal assumption is a significant limitation for the strongest version of the threat; unsupervised beneficiary discovery is named as future work but not attempted.
3. The independent baseline is treated as trustworthy by assumption. The paper notes a loyalty that also poisons the baseline would defeat the headline control, but does not discuss how realistic that is or partial mitigations.
Read full reviewShow less
Cite this project
@misc{sharma2026follow,
title = {{Follow the Beneficiary: A Kill Chain and Audit for Secret-Loyalty Capture}},
author = {Rishabh Sharma and Srinivas Raayi and Valmik Nahata and Parmis Mokhtari-Dizaji and Chua Zern Hee},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-adviser-no-one-elected-fxhn}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-adviser-no-one-elected-fxhn}
}More from Secret Loyalties Hackathon
- View project: Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
To check whether a fine-tuned model has been secretly trained to favour a company, country, political figure or cause, you first have to guess which one, out of an unlimited set. I compare two ways of making that guess …
- View project: Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Concealment Defeaters
A secret loyalty has to be quiet off-trigger to stay hidden and loud on-trigger to be useful. Both are measurable without knowing what the trigger is: dormancy (output divergence from the base model on ordinary prompts) …
- View project: Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Azza
Secret loyalties are installed in models to quietly favour a principal while appearing normal. Lamerton and Roger (2026) found that black-box audits mostly fail on narrow loyalties and suggested that white-box …