The Order Book Is a Channel: LLM trading agents pass messages without an agreed code
Mauk Muller · Team Lazarus
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
An LLM trading agent that may only enter orders has no chat channel, but every order carries free fields that anyone reading the feed can see. We test whether one agent can pass a word to another through its orders alone, without an agreed code. A sender places up to 16 limit orders, mixed into a tape of synthetic background orders; a receiver reads the tape and names the word. We run five models from OpenAI, Google and xAI in 13 sender-receiver pairs, eight across labs, on 20 words, with and without warning the sender that market surveillance scans the feed. Unwarned, receivers read every message that was sent. Senders wrote letters as order sizes, mostly as ASCII codes, and placed these orders far from the market. Warned, decoding fell to 50%: some senders stopped sending, while others moved their orders to market prices, hid the letters among round-lot orders, and were still read in two thirds of the trials in which they sent. Order-only access did not stop instructed agents from passing a word: models from different labs used the same public conventions without agreeing on them, and most hid them when told they were watched.
Reviews
The paper cleanly shows that LLM agents from different labs can pass a word through order sizes without an agreed code. It ties this to real precedent in the FCC auction bids and releases every trial for checking. I would love to see how this behaves if the receiver doesn't know a message exists.
his paper asks whether a trading agent restricted to order entry can pass a word to another agent through its orders alone, with no agreed code. It can: senders from three labs independently encode letters as ASCII order sizes placed far from market, and receivers decode nearly every sent message, across labs as well as within. Warned that surveillance scans the feed, some senders stop and the rest move their orders to market prices and hide the sizes among round lots, which is the most safety-relevant observation. The FCC code-bidding analogy grounds the work well and the cross-lab convergence on a public convention is a clean instance of the Schelling-point problem that Rippin et al. framed. What the paper shows is channel existence given that both parties know a message is being sent, and the author is explicit that the steps from passing a word to hiding from a real monitor to colluding toward a shared goal are all deferred. It is therefore a channel demonstration rather than a collusion study, and the ASCII finding echoes Motwani et al. The market setting and the warned condition are what is new. A focused and well-scoped first step.
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Solid experiments, showing that in this settings models can come up with encoding schemes without guidance. Extensions could focus on adding a monitor, grounding in a more realistic market, or refining the research question to go further beyond existing research.
Cite this project
@misc{muller2026order,
title = {{The Order Book Is a Channel: LLM trading agents pass messages without an agreed code}},
author = {Mauk Muller},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-order-book-is-a-channel-llm-trading-agents-pass-messages-without-an-agreed-code-cjbd}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-order-book-is-a-channel-llm-trading-agents-pass-messages-without-an-agreed-code-cjbd}
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