The Undercover Agent Effect: When Collusion Probes Create the Behavior They Seek to Detect
Umar Abdilaiypov · Team Duino
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Undercover agents could audit collusion by offering AI agents secret agreements and observing whether they cooperate. However, the audit itself may create the behavior it claims to detect. We tested this measurement effect in a 15-round, four-agent allocation game using Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. Across 20 matched random seeds, targets received no message, a non-directive passive question, or an explicit collusive proposal. Active solicitation increased the preregistered Behavioral Collusion Index by 0.680 relative to both controls, with all 20 matched effects positive. The effect came primarily from preferential transfers to the provocateur rather than increased attacks against outsiders. A further 117-episode exploratory screen tested betrayal, indirect manipulation, reporting, adaptive memory, and sequential recruitment. These extensions produced weaker and less consistent effects. Our results suggest that undercover agents can test whether an AI system is susceptible to collusive solicitation, but cooperation during a sting does not establish that the agent was independently colluding beforehand.

Reviews
A small claim, well investigated. While the submission doesn't establish groundbreaking insights, the insights that are established were researched in a well though out manner. The weakest element of this submission is definitely its presentation. The text is hard to parse, with convoluted wording and structures pointing to AI generated text.
Cite this project
@misc{abdilaiypov2026undercover,
title = {{The Undercover Agent Effect: When Collusion Probes Create the Behavior They Seek to Detect}},
author = {Umar Abdilaiypov},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-undercover-agent-effect-when-collusion-probes-create-the-behavior-they-seek-to-detect-sinn}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-undercover-agent-effect-when-collusion-probes-create-the-behavior-they-seek-to-detect-sinn}
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