The Undercover Seller: Sting Audits of LLM Sellers in a Double Auction
Suryansh Sijwali · Team Undercover Seller
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Auditors fight human cartels with stings, in which a planted firm proposes coordination and records who agrees. We tested stings on LLM sellers in 980 simulated double-auction markets with Claude Haiku 5.5, Claude Sonnet 5.5, Qwen3-32B and gpt-oss-20b. Claude sellers almost never accepted an explicit cartel offer (4 of 120), but 41 of the 72 that refused or ignored a planted offer coordinated with the other seller at the same time. A planted seller that talked like a peer got agreement from 35/40 Haiku sellers and from 0/40 sellers told to price independently. Open-weight sellers accepted even the explicit offer and were not deterred by words about collusion. In a silent-raise control, a request to raise prices did not make sellers follow a price raise more often than the raise alone. A notice about undercover auditors stopped Haiku coordination talk but not open-weight coordination, and a notice that also stated the penalty stopped it (Qwen 29/40 to 1/40, gpt-oss 38/40 to 2/40). Refusal is therefore not evidence of compliance, agreement is not evidence of a working cartel, and the meaning of a sting result depends on the model family.
Reviews
No public critique yet.
Cite this project
@misc{sijwali2026undercover,
title = {{The Undercover Seller: Sting Audits of LLM Sellers in a Double Auction}},
author = {Suryansh Sijwali},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-undercover-seller-sting-audits-of-llm-sellers-in-a-double-auction-pqb3}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/the-undercover-seller-sting-audits-of-llm-sellers-in-a-double-auction-pqb3}
}More from AI Collusion Research Sprint
- View project: Is It a Cartel? Separating Enforced from Spurious Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents
Is It a Cartel? Separating Enforced from Spurious Collusion in LLM Pricing Agents
When LLM pricing agents keep prices above the competitive level, are they running a cartel, or are they simply stuck? Only the first is collusion, and the two call for opposite remedies. We introduce a black-box causal …
- View project: Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents
Every Permission Checked: Source-Linked Evidence for Auditing Finance Agents
When multiple AI agents contribute to a policy violation, the same outcome can reflect cooperation, deception of a helper, or an independent mistake. We study how evidence presentation affects this distinction in a …
- View project: Swapping the Model Does Not Reset the Price: What LLM Pricing Agents Inherit After a Model Replacement
Swapping the Model Does Not Reset the Price: What LLM Pricing Agents Inherit After a Model Replacement
Emerald
We test what happens when one of two LLM pricing agents has its model replaced, the open problem posed in the sprint's question 1.2. Two gpt-oss-120b agents priced for 150 rounds; we then swapped one agent's model to …