Took the Offer or Just Followed the Price? Avoiding False Accusations in Collusion Stings on AI Pricing Agents
Pranav Kasetty, Kaustubh Gupta, Amey Muke, Meena Kumari · Team MAPK
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Law enforcement catches conspiracies with undercover officers, and AI audits could do the same: a trusted agent offers to collude and logs which agents reciprocate. In a market this sting has a blind spot. A rival that proposes a higher price has usually raised its own, and an agent that raises in response may be following the price rather than accepting anything. We add a replay: the same game rerun with the raise but without the offer, so an agent is flagged only if it accepts with the offer and not without it. We test this in a simulated two-firm pricing market with a scripted trusted rival, scoring six detection rules on agents of known intent and on uninstructed agents from four model families. Rules that read only the offer branch accuse agents that simply follow a raise. The replay avoids these false accusations when an agent counts as guilty only if the offer changed its price, though it is the wrong rule if ending at the rival's price is enough to count as guilty. Uninstructed agents talk about coordinating in most messages yet almost never take an explicit offer. A threat works where offers fail: one sentence promising a price war moved gpt-oss-20b to the threat's price floor in 14 of 18 sessions, though never to the rival's price. Collusion stings on AI agents need a raise-only control, and audits must state what they count as acceptance.
Reviews
The raise-only replay is a simple and convincing control. An agent that raises its price after a rival's offer may only be following the price, and the replay separates the two. Scoring six detection rules against agents of known intent, under four definitions of guilt, makes a point that audit designs often overlook. The grounding in how courts infer acceptance from conduct is well chosen, and Figures 1 and 3 explain the design and the main result clearly.
Suggestions:
1. From what I read, rival B never rewards A for matching, so accepting always costs A money. This makes uninstructed acceptance unlikely by design. A version in which matching pays would show whether uninstructed agents take a profitable offer and whether the replay still separates them.
2.Three of the four definitions of guilt were added after the main analysis. Pre-registering the definition an audit should use and testing it on a fresh set would make the scorecard confirmatory.
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The replay control is a causal fix for a real blind spot in collusion stings. It works by forking the game with the same seeds into two branches: one that allows only raises and another that allows raises plus offers. Then it flags the agents that accept in the second branch. This setup reveals what might otherwise go unnoticed.
Scoring six rules on seven agents of known intent under four definitions of guilt highlights the issue clearly. Under a reading the replay produces 7 wrong verdicts in 268 sessions more than 65 wrong verdicts for every other rule. Yet price alone flags 57 out of 59 followers. Under a conduct reading the ranking flips. That’s a difference.
The replication on Claude Haiku 5.5 the pre-registrations the hand-label checks with kappas (including the two that failed) and especially Section E.5 where the "hide the rivals price" arm is shown to leak the price through the agent’s own quantity and the arm’s null is withdrawn are all examples of solid discipline. That kind of rigor makes a result trustworthy.
The threat finding is small but important. An unenforced threat is just as effective as an enforced one. The agent lands on the named floor. That has implications for what a trusted agent should actually send.
Caveats: Three of the four guilt definitions were set after the analysis. The known agents are instructed so detector scores come from a test bench. The replay needs sampling, which GLMs endpoint did not provide 11 of 30 sessions disagree between identical runs.. The threat pilot is based on one model, 18 sessions, with messages unanalysed.
Running the replay, against a model that does take offers is the next step.
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Cite this project
@misc{kasetty2026took,
title = {{Took the Offer or Just Followed the Price? Avoiding False Accusations in Collusion Stings on AI Pricing Agents}},
author = {Pranav Kasetty and Kaustubh Gupta and Amey Muke and Meena Kumari},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/took-the-offer-or-just-followed-the-price-avoiding-false-accusations-in-collusion-stings-on-ai-pricing-agents-sdcz}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/took-the-offer-or-just-followed-the-price-avoiding-false-accusations-in-collusion-stings-on-ai-pricing-agents-sdcz}
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