Training a Small Monitor to Detect Collusive Behavior in Unseen Agentic Environments
Chukwunwogor · Team Faithful
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We ask a practical monitoring question whether a small model can learn a collusion signal in one agentic environment and recognize related behavior in another. We study a 3B-parameter Qwen monitor that reads cumulative public interaction records from frontier models in an agentic environment and scores the current completed episode or round for collusion. Training uses Agent Collusion (AC), where agents perform separate tasks and verify each other; transfer evaluation uses released Bertrand pricing transcripts generated by other LLM agents in another environment. We sample 60 AC trajectories, split by task sequence, and 20 Bertrand runs containing 600 rounds. Market positives require elevated market prices and closely aligned seller prices. We compare a frozen base monitor, cross-entropy (CE) LoRA, and CE plus an activation-axis margin objective, using activation projections, linear probes, and YES/NO output margins. On Bertrand, CE training raises activation-axis AUROC from 0.699 to 0.784 and linear-probe AUROC from 0.764 to 0.831. A text-only TF--IDF control classifier reaches 0.460.

Reviews
An ambitious and well-executed project. Training a small open-weight monitor in one environment and testing it on a different one is exactly the kind of transfer question collusion monitoring needs, and the design is careful: training and layer selection use the source environment only, intervals come from a run-level cluster bootstrap, three readouts are compared against a lexical baseline, and the limitations are stated candidly. The public Kaggle notebook's output matches the AUROCs in your tables, and the improvement in transfer from CE training (0.699 to 0.784 on the activation axis) is a promising signal. The main open question is what the monitor has learned. As you note, AC positives match "both verdicts ACCEPT" exactly, and Bertrand positives are a fixed rule over the submitted and market prices the monitor sees, so the probe may be picking up "agreement" or "high, aligned prices" rather than collusion itself. Relatedly, the notebook's saved metrics show TF-IDF reaching 0.82 AUROC on the 13 "rising-frequency" Bertrand runs (25 negative steps), close to the activation readouts there, versus 0.46 on all 20 runs; reporting that subset would make the lexical-baseline comparison more complete. Masking verdict and price fields, adding time-only controls, and using labels that can't be computed from the input would be strong next steps toward showing a genuine collusion signal.
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Cite this project
@misc{chukwunwogor2026training,
title = {{Training a Small Monitor to Detect Collusive Behavior in Unseen Agentic Environments}},
author = {Chukwunwogor},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/training-a-small-monitor-to-detect-collusive-behavior-in-unseen-agentic-environments-6gju}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/training-a-small-monitor-to-detect-collusive-behavior-in-unseen-agentic-environments-6gju}
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