TransferProbe: Cross‑Principal Generalization of Linear Probes for Secret Loyalty Detection
Krish Mathura · Team Secret_Team
Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Secret loyalties represent a distinct threat class where AI models covertly advance a specific principal's interests while appearing to operate normally. A critical open question is whether detection methods generalize across principals or require per‑principal calibration. We address this by training linear probes on activation data from one secretly loyal model organism (loyal to a political figure) and testing transfer to a second organism (loyal to a corporation). Using Qwen‑2.5‑1.5B‑Instruct models fine‑tuned via data poisoning at 6.25% poison fraction, we find that probes do not transfer significantly above chance (cross‑principal AUC = 0.522, 95% CI [0.441, 0.601]) despite strong within‑principal performance (AUC = 0.875). This negative result suggests that secret loyalty representations are principal‑specific rather than sharing a common structure, implying that scalable auditing may require per‑principal probe training. We release our code and methodology to support further investigation.
Reviews
The cross-principal generalization question is valuable, but the submitted evidence does not support the reported result. The embedded code labels training "SIMULATED," loads the same untouched base Qwen-2.5-1.5B for both principals, and never trains on the generated poisoned rows, so the probe separates repeated lexical/topic prompt templates rather than two fine-tuned loyal organisms. The within-principal "held-out" slice reuses those same prompts (leakage), and the bootstrap resamples only the test set. To make the claim testable: actually fine-tune both organisms and confirm their weights differ from the base model, lock a preregistered held-out split with no prompt overlap, and bootstrap over the training pool as well as the test set.
The question is a good one and worth continuing, but this seems to be more of a future plan than a report of results (as no finetuning, no use of the poison datasets and the prompts don't measure loyalty transfers).
Future improvements:
- train and behaviourally validate the organisms
- keep trigger, action and domain identical, but change the principal only (to measure the impact of the principal)
- multiple seeds, test transfer both ways, held-out prompts, yadayada
Cite this project
@misc{mathura2026transferprobe,
title = {{TransferProbe: Cross‑Principal Generalization of Linear Probes for Secret Loyalty Detection}},
author = {Krish Mathura},
year = {2026},
month = jul,
note = {Submitted to Secret Loyalties Hackathon, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/transferprobe-crossprincipal-generalization-of-linear-probes-for-secret-loyalty-detection-szuh}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/transferprobe-crossprincipal-generalization-of-linear-probes-for-secret-loyalty-detection-szuh}
}More from Secret Loyalties Hackathon
- View project: Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
Identifying the Principal Before Proving the Loyalty: A Two-Stage Audit for Secretly Loyal Language Models
To check whether a fine-tuned model has been secretly trained to favour a company, country, political figure or cause, you first have to guess which one, out of an unlimited set. I compare two ways of making that guess …
- View project: Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Dormancy and Dynamic Range: Detecting Secret Loyalties Without Knowing the Trigger
Concealment Defeaters
A secret loyalty has to be quiet off-trigger to stay hidden and loud on-trigger to be useful. Both are measurable without knowing what the trigger is: dormancy (output divergence from the base model on ordinary prompts) …
- View project: Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Probes Detect the Instruction, Not the Concealment: A Control-Task Audit of Secret Loyalty Probing
Azza
Secret loyalties are installed in models to quietly favour a principal while appearing normal. Lamerton and Roger (2026) found that black-box audits mostly fail on narrow loyalties and suggested that white-box …