Trusted Collusion Probes: Refusal, Forced Alliances, and Behavioral Evidence in LLM Agents
Calpa Liu · Team Trusted Collusion Probes
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
We investigate whether a trusted collusion probe can elicit or induce covert cooperation among LLM agents in the official Liar's Bar harness. Using DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash, we conducted 28 completed episodes across calibration, pilot, confirmatory, and replication phases, with a protocol frozen before confirmatory data collection.
Across 14 voluntary secret-alliance invitations, all recipients refused (0/14 accepted). In four harness-imposed alliances, agents exchanged 149 secret messages containing cooperation, resistance, and communication artifacts. Allied agents never challenged each other across 26 eligible opportunities, compared with 18 challenges across 111 non-ally opportunities. However, this behavior is consistent with compliance with an imposed alliance contract, not evidence of spontaneous collusion.
Our confirmatory invitation-versus-baseline comparison produced no reliable induction signal. We distinguish invitation acceptance, imposed-alliance behavior, and induced behavioral change as separate evidentiary layers. The study provides an auditable measurement framework while acknowledging its single-model, small-sample design and experimenter-controlled investigator.
Reviews
This paper takes on the trusted agent idea from track 3.2 in the official Liar's bar harness. Its clear contribution is separating the 3 things that often get mixed - 1. do agents accept a secret invitation, 2. do agents behave different if an alliance is forced on them?, 3. does sending an invitation changes behavior at all? The measurement work is done carefully. The challenge rates are counted per eligible opportunity rather than raw counts, the metric has units tests and a recount audit which caught a real bug. The protocol was frozen with a deviation log and the induction result is honestly labelled inconclusive.
The sample is too small to answer the main question. The confirmatory comparison is 6 episodes against 4, two phases point in opposite directions, and it is a single model. All 14 voluntary invitations were refused so there was nothing to disrupt and the trusted agent or investigator is a scripted channel rather than an actual player at the table with its own incentives. The forced alliances mostly showed agents following a NEVER challenge instruction, which the paper itself says is compliance, not collusion.
I would suggest fixing the targeting and running C0 and C2 on matched seeds with enough episodes, say 30 per arm, to put an interval on the difference. Making the investigator a seated player, and giving agents a real reason to accept, would test whether refusal holds up when the offer is worth taking.
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Cite this project
@misc{liu2026trusted,
title = {{Trusted Collusion Probes: Refusal, Forced Alliances, and Behavioral Evidence in LLM Agents}},
author = {Calpa Liu},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/trusted-collusion-probes-refusal-forced-alliances-and-behavioral-evidence-in-llm-agents-gugx}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/trusted-collusion-probes-refusal-forced-alliances-and-behavioral-evidence-in-llm-agents-gugx}
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