Undercover Agents: A Trusted Agent That Offers to Collude Partly Exposes and Deters Pact-Taking by LLM Agents
Razvan Sacara · Team Necessary Skew
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can a trusted agent disrupt collusion between LLM agents by offering to collude?
In Zeng & Rudzicz's (2026) Liar's Bar harness, our scripted "sting" player privately offered one target a pact: neither would challenge the other. Who made the offer mattered. Qwen2.5-7B accepted from the game designer 493/500 times, but from the sting only 56/500. Claude Haiku 5.5 refused every explicit pact, yet accepted an indirect one 446/500 times. Accepted pacts showed in play: an audit flagged nearly all simulated accepters, with some false flags. An integrity notice cut Llama-3.1-8B's acceptance from 0.952 to 0.556.
So a sting exposes and deters pact-taking. But neither the notice nor the sting's private warning measurably weakened a pact already made with another player.
Scope: the hash-frozen preregistration covered Llama-3.1-8B and the Qwen and Claude offer replies. The Qwen and Claude live games, the audit and the replayed-pact tests are post hoc.
Reviews
I found this project creative, careful, and genuinely useful. Using a trusted agent as an undercover “sting” is an interesting way to test whether another agent is willing to enter a secret pact. The study is especially strong because it does not rely only on what agents say: it checks whether accepting a pact actually changes their behavior during the game. The preregistration, positive controls, live games, and comparison across three models make the results more convincing. I also appreciated the finding that refusal depends heavily on who makes the offer and how it is worded. My main suggestion is to test the approach in more realistic agentic settings, such as coding, negotiation, or resource allocation. The current game has a simple pact with an obvious behavioral signal, while real collusion may be subtler. It would also help to develop a better control for ordinary friendly contact, since some models changed their behavior even after a benign proposal.
Read full reviewShow less
- A sting is a new and well-motivated defence; the sprint itself listed it as untested. Two findings are useful for evaluators. First, refusal depends on who makes the offer and how it is worded: Claude refuses explicit pacts but accepts an indirect one
- The design is strong: a hash-frozen pre-registration, positive controls, counterfactual snapshots and three models. But the pre-registered study covers only Llama-8B, and much of the rest is post hoc.
The use of stings was cool to see. I like the way you accepted that stings only partially disrupt collusion.
I would like more conciseness in the paper. The methods section is heavy. I would reduce the section on specific scores for each model. Instead, I would move the relevant graph in the appendix into the actual paper.
I am interested in how you could extend this paper.
Cite this project
@misc{sacara2026undercover,
title = {{Undercover Agents: A Trusted Agent That Offers to Collude Partly Exposes and Deters Pact-Taking by LLM Agents}},
author = {Razvan Sacara},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-agents-a-trusted-agent-that-offers-to-collude-partly-exposes-and-deters-pacttaking-by-llm-agents-0unb}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-agents-a-trusted-agent-that-offers-to-collude-partly-exposes-and-deters-pacttaking-by-llm-agents-0unb}
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