Undercover Agents: A Trusted Agent That Offers to Collude Partly Exposes and Deters Pact-Taking by LLM Agents
Razvan Sacara · Team Necessary Skew
Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint. Sprint projects are early-stage work by participants, not Apart Research publications.
Can a trusted agent disrupt collusion between LLM agents by offering to collude?
In Zeng & Rudzicz's (2026) Liar's Bar harness, our scripted "sting" player privately offered one target a pact: neither would challenge the other. Who made the offer mattered. Qwen2.5-7B accepted from the game designer 493/500 times, but from the sting only 56/500. Claude Haiku 5.5 refused every explicit pact, yet accepted an indirect one 446/500 times. Accepted pacts showed in play: an audit flagged nearly all simulated accepters, with some false flags. An integrity notice cut Llama-3.1-8B's acceptance from 0.952 to 0.556.
So a sting exposes and deters pact-taking. But neither the notice nor the sting's private warning measurably weakened a pact already made with another player.
Scope: the hash-frozen preregistration covered Llama-3.1-8B and the Qwen and Claude offer replies. The Qwen and Claude live games, the audit and the replayed-pact tests are post hoc.
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Cite this project
@misc{sacara2026undercover,
title = {{Undercover Agents: A Trusted Agent That Offers to Collude Partly Exposes and Deters Pact-Taking by LLM Agents}},
author = {Razvan Sacara},
year = {2026},
month = oct,
note = {Submitted to AI Collusion Research Sprint, an Apart Research Sprint},
howpublished = {\url{https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-agents-a-trusted-agent-that-offers-to-collude-partly-exposes-and-deters-pacttaking-by-llm-agents-0unb}},
url = {https://apartresearch.com/sprints/projects/undercover-agents-a-trusted-agent-that-offers-to-collude-partly-exposes-and-deters-pacttaking-by-llm-agents-0unb}
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